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Editorial

OBERLIN AND THE NATURE OF THE UNITY WE SEEK

THE ecumenical movement has become a fact of unquestioned significance in the life of contemporary Christendom. The history of the past half-century has been punctuated by important conferences, each of which has made its contribution to the development of the movement. It is still too early to predict what place the recent gathering at Oberlin will assume in the on-going process of ecumenical advance. It was a conference organized on a regional, not on a world-wide, basis. Consequently it was imperfectly representative of the ecclesiastical spectrum. But it arose out of, and was related to, the life of a strong and important segment of Christendom. In North America it is perhaps more difficult than elsewhere to bridge the gap between the ecumenical and the local. Yet the size, vigour, vitality and diversity which characterize American churches make it a matter of urgent importance that the ecumenical movement should be more than the hobby of a select circle of specialists. The final assessment of the value of the conference will be largely determined by the measure in which it contributed to the solution of this problem.

A preliminary judgment suggests that to an important degree the conference represented a "break-through" at least to the middle stratum of American church leadership. Oberlin was fortunate in having the participation of many of the men and women who are most active in the ecumenical movement and best informed about its concerns, but these by no means constituted the bulk of the membership. Many of those present had never shared in an international gathering; it is safe to assume that many of them never will. This is no reflection on their capacity; it is simply a consequence of the scale on which American life is organized. It comes as a shock to Canadians to realize that in the United States there are nearly a thousand executive secretaries of church councils (local, state, or regional). Denominational officials represent a great host; so do professors in colleges and seminaries. These were the people who came to Oberlin. The confusion which at the outset prevailed in some of the sections was probably a reflection of the fact that to many of the participants the experience was novel and the methods new.

Confusion may have been an initial problem but it was not the final characteristic of the conference. With surprising rapidity the members of the sections broke through to a genuine ecumenical encounter. The frustrating phase was briefer and less stultifying than might have been expected. Various explanations of this fact can be advanced: the diversities of American church life mean that most people have had to associate with fellow Christians of other traditions; co-operative enterprises have fostered habits of

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adjustment. But by themselves these are scarcely sufficient. Throughout the conference, the conviction grew that though an "ecumenical mind" has not yet emerged, an "ecumenical temper" is already a reality. Christians have learned to approach each other in a humbler and less aggressive frame of mind than was formerly the case.

A co-operative spirit is an important asset; by itself it cannot guarantee the success of a conference. Oberlin was notable because of the quality and character of the preparatory work which preceded it. Local study groups had been established in all parts of the continent. For months they had been studying the issues with which the conference was concerned. The papers presented to these groups had been widely circulated. Everyone who came to Oberlin had already participated in a process of intensive discussion. It would be rash to assume that everyone had benefited to the fullest extent from this opportunity; doubtless many of the essays were filed away unread, but it is clear that the quality of many of the conference reports was the direct result of an educational programme of unique intensity. As a demonstration of what can be achieved in this respect, Oberlin was an impressive object lesson. Its values should be conserved; perhaps they will be, since on few points was the conference more unanimous than in requesting that a continuing programme of studies be initiated, comparable in scope and intensity with the work done in preparation for Oberlin.

The value of these preliminary studies was proved not merely by the spirit in which the delegates approached their task, but by the clarity with which it was set before them. The purpose of the conference was to study "the nature of the unity we seek." Few subjects have been left so largely to the mercy of vague enthusiasm; in few was the need of more precise definition so urgent. Unity was considered in three major areas. The first was concerned with our beliefs and convictions, the second with our corporate life and organization, the third with our witness amid the social and cultural complexities of our society. Each of these divisions comprised four sections. A wide range of subject matter was set forth in a way which encouraged intensive consideration. It also afforded full scope to a wide variety of gifts; both theologians and administrators had ample opportunity to share their experience and to gain new insights into the needs and opportunities of our day.

The churches, of course, did not send their representatives to Oberlin merely to provide them with the opportunity of participating in stimulating debate. They obviously hoped for results. Were any forthcoming? In some quarters extravagant expectations were entertained: it was assumed that a conference on unity would produce specific plans for union. That was not its function; even if the objective had been feasible, it would have been beyond the reach of so large a body, meeting for so short a time. Oberlin was a "study conference," and the immediate results of any educational process cannot be quickly or accurately assessed. Its aim was as much to define objectives as to achieve them. After all, people are more likely to reach their

goal if they know what it is. Nor should we forget the importance of many results which are no less real because they are intangible. The achievement of unity depends on understanding as much as it does on programmes. An atmosphere of charity and mutual appreciation, a mood of hope and expectancy—these are vital to any progress toward unity, and they are the direct result of such knowledge one of another as Oberlin was able to encourage.

This is the kind of faint and nebulous praise which has damned many a well-intentioned conference. Did Oberlin achieve nothing more than the glow of vague good-will which is often the sole deposit of the gathering together of Christians? There is no denying the dangers which beset ecumenical gatherings. It is perilously easy for the initiates to repeat an intricate but familiar series of manoeuvres. Points of agreement and of disagreement are set forth in ways already familiar to the experts, but no appreciable progress is achieved in any direction. Did Oberlin do any better? The answer will doubtless vary according to the section or division with which participants were primarily familiar. In some cases nothing emerged beyond a clearer definition of problems and a sharper delimitation of the areas within which solutions might be found. Such limited progress is by no means negligible and need not be dismissed with impatience or contempt. But far more than this is needed if the ecumenical movement is to justify the hopes it has aroused. The major achievement of Oberlin was to point to new and promising avenues of advance. Even the differences which divide the churches were "redefined in novel and stimulating ways." The imperatives of the Gospel—the constraints which arise from our common faith and which make us ashamed of our divided state—were set forth with a clarity which can be attributed to the pervasive influence of Biblical theology. But the exciting feature of the conference was the way in which it pointed toward a fresh approach to problems "which in the past have often proved their power to keep Christians apart." This was particularly true of the sacraments. Baptism has hitherto played a subsidiary part in ecumenical discussions. At Oberlin we discovered that many easy assumptions required re-examination, but that when the problem was seen in a new perspective it opened up intriguing prospects of closer understanding. The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is so stubborn a source of division that there might seem to be little hope of discovering an untried way that would lead us forward. We have so often deplored our separation at the Lord's Table—our point of deepest division, the source of most the flagrant scandal in Christendom—that there seemed little else that we could do. Oberlin did not offer a solution, but it did set the question in a slightly different context, and indicated ways in which this intractable problem might finally be solved. Much remains to be done, but a conference which can suggest a new and promising approach to such difficulties has deserved well of the churches.

In the specifically theological field, Oberlin may therefore prove to be a milestone of some significance. Both in achievement and in promise, it went

far beyond many previous conferences. It was able to build, of course, on the results of their labours. In its own turn it will contribute in a wide variety of ways to the creation of that atmosphere of respect and confidence in which alone true unity can develop. It re-emphasized the elementary fact which we forget to our peril—that in our divided state we are not meeting the demands of our age. And in simple propositions it set before the churches certain elementary truths which must always govern our search for closer relations and deeper fellowship: unity belongs to the essential nature of the church; this unity must be made visible to the world in a greater measure than that in which the corporate life of our churches now manifests it; and it must provide freedom for an extensive measure of diversity.

G.R.C.

Hamann's Conversion

STEPHEN NEILL

ON April 16, 1757, the packet from Rotterdam disgorged on the shores of England at Harwich a young German from Königsberg in East Prussia. Rather less than a year later, on March 13, 1758, the same young man began to read the Bible. On March 19 he began to write down his thoughts on what he read. By April 21 he had reached the Revelation of St. John the Divine, and the "Biblical Reflections of a Christian" were complete. The literary career of Johann Georg Hamann had begun; and, in the remarkable phrase of his biographer Josef Nadler, "with this experience of Hamann in London the new intellectual Germany of his century had been born."

I give notice that from now on it will be a necessary part of the equipment of every promising young theologian to be able to talk intelligently about Hamann. Kierkegaard has had a wonderfully good run for his money. When I first became interested in Kierkegaard in 1928, none of his works, I think, had been translated into English; and the only thing readily available was the (for its period) astonishingly excellent article by Principal Grieve in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.* (The name of Hamann does not occur in the Index to *E.R.E.*) Then followed the great flood of translations and studies; and for nearly a generation Kierkegaard has been definitely "U," especially if one manages to quote those bits of him where the eminent and diligent translators were not quite sure of the meaning of the Danish, and so managed to redouble the obscurity of the original. But now that day is coming to its end. Almost all the possible doctoral theses on S.K. have been written, and he tends to become *vieux jeu.* P. T. Forsyth has had his innings. But in any case he had the misfortune to write in English, and intelligibly, so that he will never attain to the very highest level of "U-ness." And now, in our moment of need, comes Hamann. There has been of late years a widespread revival of Hamann-studies in Germany, and the results of this are just beginning to splash over to the English-speaking world. Now is the time to get ahead of the market. And how glorious are the possibilities! Nothing of Hamann has yet been translated into English; I do not think it likely that much ever will be. Even the Germans admit that he can hardly be read without a commentary; and most of what he wrote seems to me completely untranslatable. Where obscurity is concerned, Hamann's little finger is thicker than Kierkegaard's loins. What could be more "U" than that?

If that was all, I would not be writing about him. There is nothing that I loathe more than the habit of re-discovering some quite insignificant theologian or poet of the seventeenth or eighteenth century, and giving him a

temporary and artificial vogue. But this is not that. Dr. Nadler is an intelligent man. His remark that exactly two centuries ago a new intellectual Germany came into being, and that the man who single-handed brought it into being was Hamann, demands to be taken with careful seriousness. Who was this man, who was the close friend and shepherd of Herder; whom Kant knew and took seriously as an intellectual force; who was the sharpest and most effective critic that Lessing ever had to meet; of whom Goethe said that he owed more to him than to any other writer; the first intensive study of whose writings was produced by no less a genius than Hegel; who is seen at point after point to have been the master of Kierkegaard? It is by way of Kierkegaard that most British and American scholars who have interested themselves in Hamann have come to him.

We must go back a little in our story. The mission on which Hamann had come to London remains a little mysterious, but it is clear that, whatever it was, it had failed. He passed some months in great restlessness of spirit, not unaccompanied by dissipation. Now, sick at heart and with his money almost all spent, he settled down in his lodgings to work through the great pile of books on which he had spent probably more money than he could afford. The pile included the books of the deists and of the rationalists. But there was also a Bible. Hamann had already read the Bible during his stay in London, the Old Testament once and the New Testament twice, but the Word had said little or nothing to him. Now, as he read, he seemed to be seeing and hearing it for the first time—it spoke to him directly in a new way, in the language of personal encounter. And, in the course of his reading, he was converted.

The conversion took place on March 31, 1758. Among all the records of conversion that I have ever read, none is more remarkable than that which Hamann himself has set down for us in "Thoughts on the Course of my Life":

> On the evening of March 31, as I was reading Deuteronomy 5, I fell into a state of profound meditation. I thought of Abel, of whom God said, "The earth hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood." I felt my heart beat; in the depths of my heart I heard a voice sobbing and lamenting, like the voice of blood, the voice of the murdered brother, who demands vengeance for his blood . . . that voice which made Cain ever restless and a fugitive. I felt my heart swell at once; I burst into tears. I could bear it no longer. I could no longer hide from my God that I was the fratricide, the murderer of my brother, His only-begotten Son. The Holy Spirit continued, in spite of my weakness, in spite of the long-continued resistance that I had maintained against His testimony and His touch, to reveal to me ever more and more the mystery of the divine love, and the benefit of faith in our gracious and only Saviour.

What is perhaps most interesting of all in this confession is that the sin of which Hamann particularly accuses himself is not the irregularities of his time of unsettlement and despair, but the sin of *Vernunft,* reason—the belief that man by searching can find out God, and that the infinite God can be reduced to the compass of the syllogisms and definitions of the human

intellect. This is most significant for the future development of Hamann and his thought.

What, then, are these "Reflections of a Christian" on the Bible? They run right through the Bible from Genesis to Revelation, with very unequal emphasis on the various parts. They are not to be understood in terms of exegesis—a task for which Hamann at that time had neither the theological equipment nor the inclination. They are as accurate a transcript as an ardent and intelligent young man could make of a dialogue between God and his own soul, which lasted for more than a month. They were obviously written extremely rapidly, without premeditation, and almost *currente calamo*. Dr. Nadler writes of them that they display "that mysterious insight, which we cannot explain, whether we have recourse to the play of the brain-cells or to the idea of divine illumination . . . They are a work of the highest merit, from the literary point of view, written in a style and language of which no one else in Germany at the time was capable, or had for a long time been capable." Hamann had made a deep study of French and of the French literary tradition, and this no doubt had its effect on his handling of the German language. But the literary aspect was far from being the most important. The "Reflections" are the story of the action and inter-action of the Word of God and the mind of a genius, with hardly any help at all other than that which the Word of God itself provides. Hamann never arranged for the publication of this work. It never saw the light, until it appeared after his death in the first edition of his collected works. He hardly ever refers to it; it was almost a private memorandum for his own use only. Yet those who know Hamann best affirm that all his later thought was there in germ—in this book written in one month by a young man twenty-seven years old. He was like one of those mathematical geniuses, who make all their great discoveries by some inexplicable process of intuition before the age of thirty, and spend the rest of their lives working out the significance of these early discoveries.

What, then, had Hamann discovered?

This was the high age of the Enlightenment. Voltaire was its king—and was Hamann's chief *bête noire*. The leaders of this great movement did not all wish entirely to banish religion; but true religion appeared to them to consist primarily of general ideas—the more general the truer—such as the human intellect ought to be able unaided to attain to. Revelation, therefore, if the idea was to be retained at all, could not be other than a crutch, an aid to weaker intellects in an adolescent stage of development, which they must hasten to outgrow. So Lessing says expressly, in § 76 of his tract on the *Education of the Human Race*: "When these [sc. truths of the intellect] were revealed, certainly they were not as yet truths of the intellect, but they were revealed, in order that they might become such truths." The teachings of Jesus and of the Bible were given only to bring us to awareness of certain truths, which our own intellect would in time have been capable of discovering. But, once such truths have been revealed, it is our business to strip

them of their historical garments, and to lift them to the level of pure intellectual truths. It was against this idea that Hamann was to fight tirelessly for the next thirty years, with learning, with passion, and with wit.

In that cool Age of Reason Hamann had re-discovered the meaning and the scandal of Revelation. His primary discoveries can conveniently be summarized under five heads:

1. He was never tired of affirming the *condescension* of God in revelation. When God reveals Himself, He always reveals Himself in the form of a Servant. (I wonder whether Fr. Lionel Thornton has read Hamann.) This was true when God appeared in Jesus Christ; He came as the meanest among men, He became in the strictest sense of the term our neighbour. But so it is with the Scriptures. "God reveals Himself; the Creator of the world becomes an author. What kind of a fate will await the books that He has written?" It is easy to foresee the answer. The critics fasten on these books. They are offended by the form of the Servant, just as His contemporaries were offended in Jesus Christ. God ought to have spoken in far more philosophical language and paid far stricter attention to the rules of taste. Such is the vanity and arrogance of the judgment that human wisdom passes on the Scriptures.

But God knew very well what He was doing. Such critics are the whole who have no need of a physician. But the Word of God is intended for the sick and it exactly suits their condition. By coming in this guise God puts to flight the proud and the self-confident. He insists that it is only as we approach His Word with humility that we shall be able to understand what it is all about. So, whereas even Christian expositors in the period of the Enlightenment tended to tone down the less attractive elements in the Scriptures—the crudities of the Old Testament histories, the roughness and occasional violence of the prophetic style, Hamann rather insists on them; this is the way in which God has been pleased to reveal Himself; this is the form in which we must be content to accept His revelation.

2. Hamann's second great principle is that of the "body-soulness" of created things, and of all human beings. The Enlightenment had tended to identify man with his intellect, and to regard the body as an inconvenient weight which has somehow become attached to the mind. Hamann will have none of this. Every intellectual experience of man comes to him primarily from without, through sight or hearing; that is to say, it takes to itself a *bodily* form. "Body," of course, must here be understood in the broadest sense. Under Hamann's rubric "body" are to be included such diverse realms as speech, history and nature; but surely he is right—all these three have this in common, that they are existence in the concrete, three-dimensional world of reality, and not in the abstract realm of pure intellectual apprehension.

This leads Hamann on to another observation of the greatest significance. Man, he says, has not only a brain; he also has sense and passion, and the senses and the passions "speak and understand nothing other than pictures."

This was an observation which generations later Sigmund Freud extended to the unconscious or the sub-conscious. We can see here how Hamann stood behind Herder, behind the reaction against the classic forms and the beginnings of the later Romantic movement. But this links up once again with Hamann's concept of revelation and of the appropriateness to it of the richly concrete, pictorial Hebrew idiom. God always approaches man as man—that is, as body and spirit, through the humble doors of sight and hearing. "When God had exhausted Himself, and talked Himself out of breath, through nature and Scripture, through created things and seers, through arguments and figures, through poets and prophets, then in the evening of the day He spoke to us through His Son—yesterday and today—until the promise of His future shall be fulfilled, no longer in the form of a Servant."

3. This second point has already illustrated something that is central in the thought of Hamann—the place that he attributed in the human make-up to the faculty of speech. If he had been asked for a brief definition of man, he might well have replied that man is a talking animal, or perhaps rather that man is an animal which can listen to articulate speech and apprehend it as meaning. For, in his view, the Word of God is always prevenient, and the attitude of man must be that of a listener, attent to hearken to the voice of God.

In the eighteenth century there was much discussion of the origin of speech. Herder among others wrote on it. Was it simply the result of a natural unfolding of an innate human capacity? Or did it rest on a divine self-impartation? Hamann comes down firmly on the side of the divine origin of speech, at the same time, however, asserting that everything that is divine is also human.

More important for our theme is his denial of the possibility of thought without speech, and his still more emphatic denial that, if wordless thought were possible, it would be superior to the thought that operates in words and pictures and concrete forms. This is the ground of his running controversy with Kant, and in particular with the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For, according to Hamann, there can be no such thing as pure reason. Kant has written a book, and a book is made up of words, and in words it is impossible to separate that which is directed to the senses from that which is directed to the intellect. This union Hamann ventures to describe as *unio sacramentalis*; the two factors in speech cannot be distinguished, any more than in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of Christ can be distinguished from the elements of bread and wine. Not even a Kant can do it. Hamann accuses Kant, therefore, of having tried to escape from the necessary limits of our creatureliness. But to attempt to rise above our creaturely estate is certainly to fall below it.

4. Fourthly, Hamann had come to an apprehension of the significance of *the event*. The Enlightenment was unhistorical in its way of thinking. Lessing had indeed tried to give a significance to history in his picture of God as the Educator of the human race—the one who through the centuries

brings the human spirit to its full development. But this is only pseudo-history. This God never *does* anything; He never introduces anything *new* into history; His function is limited to helping the evolution of those faculties which are innate in the race. This will not do at all for Hamann. For him the Word is action; the whole drama of the divine self-communication takes place in a history of redemption, a *Heilsgeschichte*, which began with Creation and the fall of the angels, reached its lowest point in the Cross of Christ, and will reach it consummation when Christ comes again to set up His reign upon the earth.

The eighteenth century was afflicted by the scandal of particularity, as metaphysicians tend to be in any age. Hamann did not merely tolerate this scandal; he leaped upon it, he gloried in it, he rubbed the noses of his opponents in it. The believer sees the same God at work today; it is the Holy Spirit Who gives to him the clue to the understanding of the history of the past.

5. Hamann's final principle is that of the *coincidentia oppositorum*, which he had learned from Nicolas of Cusa (though in one passage he wrongly attributes it to Giordano Bruno). The intellect attempts to bring all things under general rules, and is frustrated by that which will not accommodate itself to this classifying zeal. The limits of its possibilities are given by the law of contradiction. But intuition, or faith, if we prefer to call it by this name, sees beyond the contradictions to the point of their reconciliation in God. Truth is to be attained not by simplification, or by the attenuation of one of the contradictories, but by the patient waiting to which in the end is granted the revelation of the unity which lies beyond difference. The natural man is offended by the poor and beggarly elements of the Gospel; faith can see at once the heights and the depths, the heavenly and the earthly —and is not offended.

This concept is epigrammatically expressed in the title of Hamann's most famous work, *Golgatha und Scheblimini*. Even the learned might be excused for not jumping at once to the meaning of the title. *Scheblimini* is the "Sit thou at my right hand" of the 110th Psalm. Humiliation and exaltation, hiddenness and manifestation, are united in a single phrase. Technically the little book is a review of Moses Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem*, a typical Enlightenment plea for tolerance and peace between the confessions. But Hamann goes far beyond his immediate brief, and the conclusion is a meditation on the nature of truth and peace and a prayer that the God of peace, Who is higher than all reason (*höher ist denn alle Vernunft*) may sanctify us wholly through and through.

It is clear that Hamann can be cited as one of the champions of "the flight from reason." He fled from the *Vernunft* of the Enlightenment, that hard, clear intellect that wished to make all things the objects of intellectual understanding, that failed to notice the element of mystery and wonder in nature and in man, that regarded poetry as on the whole an inferior form of expression and the need for revelation as a mark of a lower level of human development. In the same way, in the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard was

to flee from the Hegelian reason—that brilliant creative intellect that would reduce everything to a system, and had no place for the exceptional, the obstinately individual, the irreducible. And so in the twentieth century Karl Barth was to revolt against his own early liberalism, against the reduction of revelation to the categories of human discovery, against a theology that had lost the dimensions of redemption, and did not know what to do with the blood of Christ that speaketh better things than that of Abel.

But, if we flee *from* reason, what do we flee *into*? "Into the irrational" say some foolish spirits. If that were what was meant, I would join my liberal friends in pronouncing a solemn curse on the whole tribe of the "irrationalists" from Hamann onwards. But that is certainly not what Hamann meant.

The problem, of course, is partly in the words that we use. Trying to explain to a German what an Englishman means by "reason" is like trying to explain cricket to an American who has never seen it played. If an Englishman fled from reason, in the sense in which that word is properly used in the English language, he would have rebelled against the God Who made him, and have brought upon himself the mournful doom pronounced by Dante over those who had lost *il ben dell' intelletto*, that capacity for the apprehension of the Truth that had once made them different from the brute beasts. But the same would not necessarily follow if he fled from *Vernunft*. So once again the question has to be posed—what did Hamann suppose himself to be fleeing *into*, when he fled from *Vernunft*?

The answer is that he believed himself to be fleeing into *reality*, the rich, glorious, concrete, varied reality, which God has created and given to man for his enjoyment and his illumination. So far from the particular being a scandal, it is the specially divine. Things can be subsumed under general laws only when they are drained of their life-blood; and this applies even more to persons than to things. A quotation from that other great apostle of the concrete, Baron von Hügel, may here serve to illustrate Hamann's meaning:

> Such [mystical] souls will not only find the contingent in *religion*, the historical, and the institutional, the *hic et nunc*, the spatial and temporal, an irritation and an (apparent) oppression and limitation; they will also tend to find . . . all the *other non-religious contingencies and activities of* man's life, a weariness and an irritation. Why the Hebrew articles—with God ever present? Why the Greek accents with His Spirit ever speaking? Why the geography of the Holy Land? Why particular prayers, why any oral prayers at all? Yet, look you, please, all the feeling can only be *one* element, *one* movement, *one* side of the full truth. For God is an immense *concretion*, not an abstraction. He is a *multiplicity* (for our apprehension) *in unity*. . . . He has made my body and its senses, He has made my love of the historical, social, institutional, even the legal; I am to *incarnate*, in my turn, the *incarnate* God . . . No floating, no drifting, no dreaming above the body, the family, society, history, institutions, but a penetrating into them, and a retiring out from them, again to return, Antaeus-like, to earth.[1]

1. Letter of January 11, 1911 (M. de la Bedoyère, *Life of Baron von Hügel*, p. 254).

With all of this Hamann would heartily have agreed, as a repudiation of an other-worldly pietism, no less than of the over-intellectualism of his opponents of the Enlightenment. We can now see why Hamann holds so firmly to the trinity of God's revelations—in Scripture, in history, and in nature. He did not believe in the equality of these revelations, or suppose that man can climb from one to the other by the use of his own unaided faculties. As we have seen, it is the Holy Spirit Who gives to man the clue, through which history becomes to him no longer a dead past with which he has no concern, but a living reality in which the same God of providence is always operative. Similarly, when a man has come to know the Creator, he can recognize His hand at work in the created thing; and thus the created thing too becomes a genuine, though a subordinate, revelation. For here too God takes on the form of a Servant, and, since He is approaching man, approaches him by means of things that man can understand.

All this sounds extraordinarily modern. It is easy to see why there has been such a revival of Hamann-studies in Germany, and why so many feel that here is a prophet who can speak with special force to a generation that is facing again so many of the same fundamental problems in a rather altered form. Within the last ten years a complete and critical edition of all the works of Hamann has at last become available to the world, and a complete edition of his correspondence is on the way. Hamann was never a systematic thinker; his writings, as has been said, rather resemble a shower of sparks. But those who have had the time and the patience to study these works in detail assure us that a pattern is beginning to emerge—the gradual working-out over a lifetime of that rich flood of insights that poured in upon Hamann, when he lived in loneliness in London in 1758.

All great men are one-sided. Hamann saw very plainly one side—the totality of being and the necessary totality of man's response to it. But there is also a place for the critical, the generalizing, intellect. To live is necessarily to be immersed in life. When D. H. Lawrence spoke of thinking with the blood, he was giving a rather crude symbolic expression to something that is vital in the life of the artist. But there is also a place for reflection, for standing back a little from life and looking at it dispassionately—provided that this process is not confused with that of living, and is not supposed to be in some way a substitute for life. Theology moves ever a little uneasily between these two poles. For a generation the tendency has been towards "the flight from reason" in the true Hamannian sense of the word. Signs are not lacking that the next movement in theology will be in the direction of a rediscovery of the place of the critical intellect, of liberalism, in the true and noble, not the reduced and Enlightenment, sense of that much misused word.[2]

2. The *Biblische Betrachtungen eines Christen* occupy pp. 7–249 of Vol. I of Hamann's *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Josef Nadler (Vienna, 1950). In writing this study I have drawn on *Johann Georg Hamann, der Zeuge des Corpus Mysticum* (Salzburg, 1949), also by Josef Nadler, on the *Hamannstudien* of that admirable scholar Fritz Blanké (Zürich, 1956), and on the excellent critical edition of *Golgatha und Scheblimini* (Gütersloh, 1956) by my friend Dr. Lothar Schreiner, now a missionary in Indonesia.

The Essential Oneness of Christ's Body

WILLIAM O. FENNELL

THERE is no conviction more firmly rooted in modern ecumenical thinking than the truth witnessed to in the title of this essay. It could not be otherwise if the touchstone of all our thinking about the nature of the Church is the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as witnessed to in Scriptures.

If we begin and end, in our thinking about the Church, with empirical evidence, we shall be forced in all honesty to assert the opposite: the Church as seen from without and experienced from within is not essentially one but many. It is divided into the various Protestant denominations each of which, in naming itself, gives adjectival qualification to the word "church." And apart from these Protestant denominations there are, on the one hand, the great Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches and, on the other, the plethora of Protestant sects. If these numerous denominations, churches and sects were but a witness to diversity within the unity of the one Church of Jesus Christ they would not call into question the essential oneness of Christ's Body. But in actuality, they bear witness to division more than to diversity. Truly to assert that the Church of Jesus Christ is essentially one is to fly in the teeth of evidence; it is to make an assertion which no phenomenological description of the church will support. It is indeed to make that venture of faith which risks affirmations in spite of all that would seem to call them into question. Yet to make such a claim, and to accept the risks it involves, is not to engage in a wishful kind of thinking divorced from all reality; it is rather to ground one's assertions in the revealed Word of God.

The New Testament clearly witnesses to the Church, the *ecclesia* of God, as essentially one Church. Although one does find the word for Church used there in the plural, there is nothing to suggest that in reality there is, or could be, more than one Church of Christ. "In the New Testament there are not many Churches but one Church in many places. The local congregation is the local expression of the one great universal community in heaven and on earth."[1] The essential unity of the Body of Christ, witnessed to in the use of the metaphor "body" itself, is both clearly asserted and implicitly assumed throughout the whole of the New Testament. In order to emphasize a point which will be patent to any unprejudiced reader of the scriptures it will suffice to call to mind only a few passages from the apostolic witness to the unity of the Church:

Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ. Is Christ divided? [I Cor. 1:2]
For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ. For by one spirit are

1. Hugh Martin: Christian Reunion, p. 44.

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we all baptized into one body . . . and have all been made to drink into one spirit. [I Cor. 12:12–13]

There is one body and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling; One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all. [Eph. 4:4–6]

The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the Body of Christ? For we being many, are one bread and one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread. [I Cor. 10:16–17]

These passages, individually and collectively, make it abundantly clear that the "ut omnes unum sint" of our Lord's "high-priestly" prayer (Jn. 17:21) has in Him become an accomplished reality. The Church which is His body is essentially one.

There is a three-fold unity ascribed to the Church in the New Testament:[2] (i) the unity of origin which resides in the fact that the Church is the creation of God, brought into being by His own divine act; (ii) a social unity resulting from and expressing the divine life shared in common by all its members; (iii) a unity of temper and belief, the effect of a common aim and loyalty and the pursuit of a common task. We shall consider briefly each of these aspects of unity in turn.

(i) The Body of Christ is essentially one because it has its origin in God Who is essentially one. The Church is not a human invention; it arose out of no social contract or voluntary association of like-minded men. The Church is the creation of God. In a very real sense it is the end of the ways of God with men. In creation and redemption God acted to bring into being a people of God that would find its life through participation in His own life. Israel's history, interpreted in the light of the prophetic witness to revelation, can be understood in no other terms than these. And that history had its culmination in Jesus Christ. Incarnation, Atonement, Resurrection, Ascension, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost—these are God in action to fulfil His purpose to create a Church. It is inconceivable that the Church which is the creation and gift of God should be other than one. Unity and community, being the very essence of God's own nature, are that which He has given to men in the gift of Himself in Jesus Christ. God the Father, in Christ who is His Son, through the Holy Spirit imparts to men that unity in community which is the Love that He is.

(ii) The Body of Christ is essentially one not only because it has its origin in God's own will and act but also because it has its continuing life in Him. The Church feeds upon the one bread of life, Jesus Christ; the Church breathes the one breath of life, the Holy Spirit. To feed together in Word and Sacrament upon this divine bread which is our forgiveness and redemption and to partake together of this divine Spirit, which is our sanctification and renewal, is to feed upon and partake of unity.

(iii) The Body of Christ is one because of "the unity of temper and

2. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 69.

belief that flows from a common aim and loyalty, and the pursuit of a common task." The one Christ is the one Head of the Body which is the Church. As Head of the Body we name Him Lord. We owe a common allegiance to Him. Christians cannot together name Him Lord and Christ and be *essentially* divided in their loyalty and aim. There is one Lord and those who name Him so are, beyond all that distinguishes or seems to separate, essentially one, for none can name Him Lord save through the Spirit of God. He unites Christians together in one aim, namely to grow in the grace and knowledge of Him. He gives to them a common task, namely to render obedience to the dictates of His will for love in Church and world and to make the Gospel concerning Him known to every creature. To know these things and to do them is to partake of unity.

II

It is difficult within the brief compass of an article to take account of all the facets of a very complex subject. It will have become quite evident by now that all that is being attempted is the statement of what one believes to be the essential nature of the Church as found in the scriptural witness to revelation and to develop briefly some of its implications for present-day ecumenical thinking. Quintessentially, the "Body of Christ" in the New Testament is represented as being a fellowship of believers whom Christ has made His own through faith and love. It is a community of persons who have become conjoined to Him through the offer of Himself to them as gracious gift and their Spirit-enabled receiving of that offering. The "Body of Christ" is also, and at the same time, a community of persons united to one another through their sharing of a common faith in Him and the love which His Spirit quickens in their hearts. *Koinonia*—a fellowship of personal beings called out of self-isolation into communion with God and their fellows, genuine corporeity as over against perverse individualism, this essentially is what "Body of Christ" means. All else is secondary to this reality: how the community expresses its faith and love in worship and in conduct; how it orders its common life together; how it thinks and speaks about the meaning of its faith and life in doctrine or in creed—all of this, although it grows out of that which is primary, that which essentially is the Body of Christ, is nevertheless secondary.

The writer is not at all unaware of the difficulties that result from adopting such a point of view. It may well be asked, for example, whether there is not a great deal of doctrine already implicit in the naming of the Church's Founder and Foundation "the Christ". And the answer must be that of course there is. But to speak of doctrine, and the other realities of Christian faith and order, life and work listed above, as secondary is not to say that they are not important or that they are unnecessary. It is rather to assert that Christ's person takes priority over all our thinking and speaking about

Him.[3] Where Christ is—living, personal, present Reality—there is the Church. Where He is not, the Church is not. God's primary community-creating gift to men is nothing less than Himself; man's primary community-creating response is the faith, working through love, which receives that gift.

III

If these things be true we are led by them to an understanding of that wherein the essential unity of the Church does *not* lie. (i) It does not lie in the fact that the Church is comprised of those who share in common a body of doctrinal beliefs or even of creedal confessions of faith. The common confession of faith which brings Christians of many "churches" together in the Ecumenical Movement, that Jesus Christ is God and Saviour, is not that which *constitutes* their fundamental unity. As a confession of faith it is a "symbol" which points beyond itself to the living Reality in Whom they participate in common. We, as Christians, rejoice to confess together the Apostles' and Nicene creeds, for in so doing we are giving expression to ourselves and to the world of those great acts of God which have made us what we are. But it is our communion with God Who has thus acted, and with one another in Him, that is our essential life and that creates our essential togetherness.

So also is it with doctrine. Doctrine is the attempt to think and say, coherently and consistently, what God has manifested to us concerning Himself and concerning the world which He has created and is redeeming and will perfect and fulfil. But such thought and speaking will always be, until the time of that fulfilment, subject to the fallibility of our finite nature and the fallibility that is rooted in our sin. Thus doctrine cannot be the essence of our unity in Christ.

Moreover, since it is *community* which is the reality of our common life and since it is community wherein our essential oneness lies, doctrine in and by itself cannot be the ground of the essential oneness of Christ's Body. For to be united through doctrine is to be united through the abstract and the impersonal. A certain kind of unity is achieved by those who hold in common a body of doctrine called the "truths of faith," but not *community*. Genuine community must be distinguished from a collectivity of individuals, held together by things external to themselves. Christian community is a relation among persons created by the relation which they share in common with the Person of the Christ.

(ii) The essential unity of Christ's Body does not reside in the fact that Christians are bound by the same ethical standards and ideals or seek to achieve similar goals in secular society. There can be no doubt that Christians in general do have identical ethical standards, ideals and aims and therefore experience a desire and a sense of obligation to join with Christians of other

3. Cf. F. W. Maurice, *The Kingdom of Christ*: "The Church is a body united in the acknowledgment of a living *Person*; every sect is a body united in the acknowledgment of a certain *Notion*."

"churches" in giving united witness to them in the world. Some find in this kind of co-operative togetherness the limit of the unity churches should seek in the ecumenical movement. But whatever of good can be said for this kind of unity, and much that is good can be said for it, it is not to be equated with the essential unity of Christ's Body. The latter is more than the mutual pursuit of aims and ends shared in common. It is personal participation in a personal Reality Who transcends all morally conceived aims and ends and Who indeed is the source of them. It is possible for Christians, as individuals or as a group, to differ in their understanding of how they ought to act in this or that concrete situation and yet to know themselves bound together with those with whom they differ in the transcendent community of faith and love which is Christ's Body.

(iii) The essential unity of Christ's Body is not to be found in the fact that all Christians worship God in a like manner through the use of a common order of service. No attempt is being made here to call into question the vital importance for Christian faith and life of an ordered service of public—and private—prayer. Doubtless there are ways of worship which serve more adequately than others to receive and express the Being of God and His meaning for our lives. How much there is that Christians can learn from one another and from the great traditions of the Church in this regard! All that we affirm here is that it is not in such ordering of our prayer and praise that our unity in Christ's Body resides. In fact a great diversity of order is quite consistent with that unity.

Of course the structure of Christian worship must be such as to offer God in Christ to men through the means of grace He has provided—through proclaimed Word and enacted Sacrament. For unless Christ is known and received there is no building up of His Body or participation in His life. But we must not confuse means with ends. Our essential unity is found in our personal relatedness to Him, and to one another in Him, on the basis of His own self-offering in Word and Sacrament.

(iv) Finally, the essential unity of Christ's Body does not lie in the organizational structure, the institutional form, of the Church. It is true that some kind of structure is necessary for the communal life of the Church, both for the creating and the sustaining of that life and the ordering of the social relations within which it will find expression. But the test for the validity of the organizational structure of the Church is its adequacy to perform the functions of the Church. The institutional structure derives from the functions and the functions derive from the Church's essential nature as a community, a *koinonia*, a fellowship of persons sharing a new life of faith and love in union with Him Who is the Christ.

IV

On the basis of the foregoing analysis of the essential oneness of Christ's Body we shall now attempt to show some of its implications for present-day ecumenical thinking and practice, particularly at points where most serious

disagreements tend to arise. Doubtless some assertions that are made will run counter to the strong convictions of some of our readers; our aim is not controversy but frank discussion within the unity of faith and love.

Firstly, if the essential unity of the Church arises out of God's action, not ours, if the Body which is one is something He creates through His gifts to us of Christ and His Holy Spirit, there can be no thought of our *achieving* the essential unity of the Church. It is ours to *receive* a unity that is already given; it is ours to seek to manifest a unity that already exists; it is ours to will to enter more fully into union with Him Who is the source and content of our togetherness.

Secondly, since the essential nature of Christ's Body is personal communion in faith and love, Church order cannot be regarded as of the essence of that Body, nor can it ever become itself an article of faith. The ministry of the Church is a functional ministry. It serves the constituting and building up of the community of faith and love. Thus the question of the proper ordering of the ministry must be answered in terms of its adequacy to perform that service. It is true that the ministry is necessary for the perpetuation and edification of the Church. Peter and his confession are the rock on which Christ builds His Church. The ministry is God's gift to the Church. He calls men and equips them with charismatic gifts for that vocation. And the believing community, recognizing that call, sets them apart and ordains them for that service. The ministry has been called into being by God in Christ to proclaim the Word and to administer the Sacraments whereby the same God in Christ gives Himself to His people, that in receiving Him they may become members of His Body. The essence of the ministry is representative service, of God before men, and of the believing community before God. The writer is among those who believe that episcopacy is the way of ordering the ministry of the Church that most adequately renders that representative service. It thus belongs to the *bene esse* of the Church. But neither episcopacy, nor any other form of ministerial order, is that which constitutes, or necessarily preserves, the essential unity of the Church of Christ. It serves to constitute Christ's Body, but it is not itself the constitutive element.

In this same connection, one can agree with those who cherish a ministry in apostolic succession as "unity expressed in the dimension of time," that is, with those who find in such a ministry a *symbol* for the continuity of the Church down through history from apostolic times. But to make it the *sine qua non* of the Church, as that which constitutes its nature, its unity, its continuity, is to substitute servant for Master and to attempt to build the Church on another foundation than that which is laid *in* Christ.

The foregoing must not be taken to mean that Christians can be indifferent to the whole question of Church order. The historical life of the Church necessitates some kind of ordering of its visible, corporate being. And there are undoubtedly ways of ordering the Church's life which are more consonant with its essential nature and purpose than are others. Much

can be learned from Scripture and tradition concerning these. All that we are contending for is that such ordering, though necessary to the Church, is not the primary element which constitutes it. It is the basic error of Roman Catholic Christianity that it makes Church order a matter of faith upon which man's eternal salvation depends, rather than regarding it from the point of view of function, asking in what way does the ordering of the ministry best serve to create, build up and give expression to that which alone is essential to man's salvation—his relation by faith to God in Christ and his life in love for the brethren.

Finally, there is the question of the "Table Fellowship." A verse from Scripture, with peculiar and disturbing relevance, comes to mind as we attempt to think of this question in relation to what has been said concerning the essential oneness of Christ's Body: "For anyone who eats and drinks without discerning the body, eats and drinks judgment upon himself" (I Cor. 11:29). Commenting on the passage from which this verse is taken, Robert Nelson has written:

> The purpose of the Lord's Supper, according to Paul, is twofold: attention is centred upon the sacrificial suffering and death of Jesus, but also on the fellowship of the faithful brethren who are united in Christ. When the Corinthians turned the supper into an occasion for gluttony and revelry, the wealthy ignoring the hunger of the poorer, they saw neither the sacrificed body of the Lord nor the loving fellowship of the *ecclesia*. As Paul demanded of them in verse 22: "Do you despise the Church of God?"[4]

Our manner of celebrating the Sacrament today is not such as to tempt us to failure to discern Christ and the loving fellowship of the *ecclesia* through gluttony and revelry. But have we not our own way, in our divided churches, of eating and drinking at the Eucharist "without discerning the Body"? If the Church of Christ is as we have understood it to be, we fail to discern the Body whenever we refuse to act upon the truth that all who believe in and love the Lord Jesus Christ are essentially one in Him and exclude from fellowship at His Table fellow-members of the *ecclesia* of God. "Fellowship at the Lord's Table," Professor Hettlinger has written, "is more than a personal experience; it is a liturgical expression of the unity of the Church."[5] Amen, we say. So let it be!

V

In conclusion we note for our comfort and inspiration that there is a paradoxical way of speaking about the essential oneness of Christ's Body in the New Testament. We find it in the Epistle to the Ephesians. There it is said quite categorically that the Body of Christ *is* one: "There is one Body and one Spirit." On the other hand it speaks about the Body *becoming* one in all its perfection: "Till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the

4. J. Robert Nelson, *The Realm of Redemption*, p. 74.
5. E. R. Fairweather and R. F. Hettlinger, *Episcopacy and Reunion*, p. 112.

knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." Thus to the unity we have been given and are given through faith and love we must add the unity we shall be given in the *eschaton*. Ecumenical thought and action take place within the tension of these two kinds of unity—which yet are one. Our ecumenical task is to seek through faith and love to give ever fuller expression within the Church and to the world of that unity in Christ which is a present reality. We are kept in our labours from impatience, disillusionment or despair by hope for that perfect unity in Christ which yet shall be.

God and the Moral Law

PETER REMNANT

IN the final paragraph of *Existentialism and Humanism* J.-P. Sartre makes the following statement:

Existentialism declares that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe that God does exist, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God.

This is characteristically cryptic and it is accompanied by neither explanation nor defence; furthermore it appears to be entirely out of key with what goes before it, where Sartre clearly suggests that his belief that there are no moral absolutes and that each man must take final responsibility for his own moral convictions rests upon his belief that there is no God. It is somewhat disconcerting to find on the final page of the book that God's non-existence, which has repeatedly been asserted to make all the difference, in fact makes none at all.

Nevertheless, Sartre's remark does involve an important point, and one, moreover, which is independent of the peculiar metaphysics of Existentialism. This point concerns the precise relationship between God—if He exists—and moral standards—if there are any.

I

It is sometimes maintained that the distinctions between right and wrong, good and bad, consist in the fact that God has commanded us to do certain things and to refrain from doing others. Upon this view to say that an act is our duty is to say that God has commanded us to perform it, and to say that an act is wrong is to say that God has forbidden it.

The Good has its basis and its existence solely in the will of God. . . There is no Good save obedient behaviour, save the obedient will. But this obedience is rendered not to a law or a principle which can be known beforehand, but only to the free, sovereign will of God. The Good consists always in doing what God wills at any particular moment.[1]

It is a corollary to this doctrine that had God commanded actions the very opposite of those He has in fact commanded then they, and not the latter, would have been morally obligatory; it is not what God commands but the fact that He commands it which creates our duty. This is a doctrine which

1. Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, pp. 53, 83.

appears to be implicit throughout most of the Old Testament[2] and has been made explicit by many subsequent writers.

It would seem that we ordinarily think of moral principles or moral standards as rules of conduct which are binding upon all beings with sufficient mental development to understand them and with sufficient freedom of choice to determine their own actions. However, if a moral rule is simply a divine command what is it which makes it binding upon us? Surely not just the fact that it is enjoined upon us by an omniscient and all-powerful being who rewards obedience and punishes disobedience; this would certainly make it *prudent* to obey, but it is difficult to believe that the moral exhortations of those who have identified moral principles with the commands of God have been nothing but counsels of prudence.

But if there is some better reason than prudence for doing whatever God may command, what is it? It has been suggested that God's commands are binding upon us because He is our creator:

> God made us and all the world. *Because of that* He has an absolute claim on our obedience. We do not exist in our own right, but only as His creatures, who *ought* therefore to do and be what he desires.[3]

God, the argument runs, has created the world with ourselves in it for some ultimate purpose; we, who have some degree of choice in our actions, can aid or obstruct the realization of this purpose by either obeying or disobeying God's instructions to us. And since we were created solely as instruments for the fulfilment of God's purpose we are therefore under an obligation to obey all of God's commands. However, such an argument, although plausible, is not free from difficulties. As Mr. Nowell-Smith points out with reference to the foregoing quotation, the argument requires for its validity the additional premiss that a creature owes obedience to its creator; this premiss is itself a moral principle and one which could not be established by showing that God has enjoined obedience upon His creatures. Nor would it be sufficient to argue that we owe God gratitude for creating and sustaining us since it is not self-evident that we owe obedience to those to whom we owe gratitude.

But surely, it may be said, our obligation to obey God and to assist in bringing about His purposes follows from His moral perfection; God's commands are absolute moral principles because they are the commands of an omniscient and morally perfect being. However, this answer will not do for the following reason. A morally excellent person is, presumably, one who always acts or strives to act in accordance with moral principles and a morally perfect being is, presumably, one who possesses moral excellence in the highest degree. But upon the present account of moral principles to say that God is morally perfect is simply to say that God always acts in accord-

2. Cf. R. J. Z. Werblowsky, "Revelation and the Law of Conduct," *Hibbert J.*, LIV, p. 66: "In this context [Rabbinic Judaism] ethics is reduced to the will of God. It is surely significant that the Bible never speaks of good and evil as such, but it says (or at least means) that which is good or pleasing, bad or displeasing, in the eyes of the Lord."

3. Bishop Mortimer, quoted in Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, pp. 37–38.

ance with His own commands. That is, as soon as we say that God's commands are the *standard* of morality we reduce to triviality the statement that God is morally perfect.

In saying . . . that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the love of God and all His glory; for why praise Him for what He has done, if He would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary.[4]

Now we could, of course, decide to use the expression "right action" as synonymous with the expression "action in accordance with God's will"—just as we could and perhaps sometimes do use it as synonymous with "action in accordance with the law of the land." But it seems clear that neither of these uses coincides with the strictly moral use of the expression; we say, for example: "Certainly what you did was right so far as the law is concerned, but was it morally right?" And although most people would agree that whatever God commands is morally obligatory and would perhaps be prepared to say that it is morally obligatory because God commands it, it seems very likely that upon having the distinction explained to them they would say that they meant only that God's having commanded something is an infallible *guarantee* of its moral obligatoriness, and not that "morally obligatory" literally *means* "God-commanded." That is, they would probably say that the statement "God has commanded something wrong" is unquestionably false but that it is not self-contradictory—that there are commands which it would be wrong of God to issue and that in view of His goodness it is quite certain that He never has issued and never will issue them.

There are certain important differences between this "ordinary" view, as I have just outlined it, and the doctrine that whatever God commands is morally obligatory simply because God commands it. If, as we ordinarily appear to suppose, there is a standard of morality by which even God's actions could be evaluated then, since we know that God is morally perfect, we know what to expect of Him. However, on the view that God's commands are themselves the standard of right and wrong we have no such basis for expectation.

God cannot be obligated to any act. With Him a thing becomes right solely for the reason that He wants it to be so. If God as a total cause were to instigate hatred toward Himself in the will of somebody . . . such a person would not be guilty of sin and neither would God, because He is not obligated to anything.[5]

We may feel certain that God will never instigate such hatred in us, but if we accept the doctrine that whatever God wills is right then our certainty cannot be based on the conviction that it would be wrong for God to do so. And, in general, upon the view under consideration, however immoral

4. Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Sect. II. Cf. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 25: "There is *one* thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris."

5. William of Ockham, *Selections*, Open Court, p. 180.

something may seem to us, however at odds it may be with our deepest moral convictions, this can be no guarantee that God will not command it—and if He were to command it we should have to say that it was right.

It might be objected here that, since God is an eternal being, it is senseless to speak as if there were any danger of our receiving moral shocks from Him in the future. There is something in this objection, but not a great deal. In so far as we can speak intelligently at all of an eternal being issuing commands it would appear that we must not speak of *a time* at which any such command is issued and *a fortiori* must not speak of the possibility of any command being issued at some future time. On the other hand, however, we, as temporal beings, come to know God's commands at definite times, and it may very well be supposed that all of us still have much to learn about God's instructions and purposes. Not only may we say, therefore, that on the view we have been discussing it is quite accidental and not at all the result of moral considerations that God did not enjoin cannibalism and sacrilege on us, but also that there is no guarantee that as we come to know more completely the principles of God's grand design we shall not find them drastically at odds with our own deepest moral certainties.[6]

That there actually is such divergence between human and divine morality has sometimes been advanced as the only cogent solution of the problem of evil. John Stuart Mill's comment upon one such statement deserves to be quoted in full. It had been argued by H. L. Mansel that what is right in the eyes of God may well differ entirely from what seems right to the highest human morality. To this Mill replied:

> If . . . I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that "the highest human morality of which we are capable of conceiving" does not sanction them; convince me of it and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by all the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.[7]

II

It must not be supposed that all philosophers and theologians have accepted the doctrine that the ultimate standards of right and wrong or of good and bad are established by "the free, sovereign will of God." As we have already seen, this view is explicitly rejected by Leibniz, who argues that there is some reason for whatever decision God makes; he continues:

6. It may be argued that we are in no danger of such moral shocks, since in practice we would accept nothing as a genuine revelation of God's will which did not conform with our deepest moral convictions. But there would be no justification for this criterion of true revelation if we regarded God's will as the ultimate standard of right and wrong.

7. *Examination of Hamilton*, 4th ed., p. 129.

This is why, accordingly, I find so strange those expressions of certain philosophers who say that the eternal truths of metaphysics and Geometry, and consequently the principles of goodness, of justice, and of perfection, are effects only of the will of God. To me it seems that all these follow from His understanding, which does not depend upon His will any more that does His essence.[8]

But what is meant by saying that the principles of morals follow from God's understanding or that the divine will acts according to the order of wisdom? In seeking a plausible interpretation of these expressions I shall first deal briefly with the position maintained by Richard Hooker.

Hooker's discussion of this question is to be found in the second section of Book I of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*. Here, like Leibniz and St. Thomas, Hooker denies "that of the will of God to do this or that there is no reason besides his will"—as the very heathen have acknowledged, God acts according to law and reason. The law, however, is God's own: it is an eternal law, hence one by which God is Himself lastingly bound, but it is nevertheless a law which God has imposed upon Himself "by his own free and voluntary act." If God were not the author of this law there would have to be some other being "worthier and higher" than God who had imposed the law upon Him. Thus, in spite of his initial denial, Hooker appears to hold a view which differs only to a minor degree from that discussed in Section I of this paper. The minor difference consists in Hooker's assertion that God is subsequently bound by His own law. As to this, however, two remarks may be made: first, if God has originally made the law God may subsequently unmake it unless there is a moral principle more fundamental than God's law, to the effect that such a law once made is endlessly binding; second, if God, as well as His law, is eternal then it apparently makes no sense to speak of His activity at a time subsequent to that at which He imposed the law upon Himself.

There are passages, however, in which it appears that Hooker means by God's law not a set of rules of conduct but the plan or purpose originally adopted by God in creating the world and toward the realization of which the world is directed—"that law, which hath been the pattern to make, and is the card to guide the world by." God's purpose remaining unchanged, all His acts of will are determined by it: "All those things which are done by him have some end for which they are done; and the end for which they are done is a reason of his will to do them." However, although this interpretation makes Hooker's position more consistent, it does not remove the difficulty with which we are concerned. It would be plausible to argue that God's commands to us were morally binding upon us if they were the means for realizing a purpose which was itself objectively good. But Hooker does not appear to employ this argument: he appears to maintain that God

8. Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Sect. II. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Disputations, XXIII de Veritate, 6: "The dictate of will should not be accounted the first rule of conduct, for will is directed by reason and mind, in God as well as in us. To say that justice depends on mere will is to say that the divine will does not act according to the order of wisdom, and is blasphemous."

chooses His ultimate purpose by a "free and voluntary act" and he gives no hint that he conceives a moral standard in terms of which such a purpose could itself be evaluated.

If it is to be maintained that the distinction of right and wrong is independent of God and that His actions and purposes may themselves be evaluated it appears necessary to assert that there is a moral standard which God did not create. Hooker, as we have seen, expressly denies that God can be bound by any law of which He is not the author, but many moralists have disagreed with him. Sir David Ross may be taken as a distinguished representative of the latter group; he says:

> . . . if we suppose that God commands us to tell the truth, we must surely say that He commands it because it is right, not that it is right because He commands it. A theist must recognize that God is in a sense subject to moral, as He is to mathematical law. . . .[9]

What is the nature of such moral law? Ross, like Leibniz, compares it with mathematical law, but the comparison appears, at first glance at least, to be a misleading one. A mathematical law (if it is not, as many philosophers now maintain, simply a tautology) presumably asserts that certain relations hold among entities of certain kinds,—*necessarily* hold, Ross maintains, in the sense that if God creates a world with such entities in it He cannot avoid their standing to each other in such relations. A moral law, on the other hand, appears to be a "commandment," a rule of conduct directing us (and God) to behave in certain ways and to avoid behaving in others.[10] If there is any sort of law with which moral laws may usefully be compared it is juridical rather than mathematical or scientific law; in fact, juridical laws have frequently been maintained to be imperfect and local reflections of moral laws. However, if we do regard moral laws as commandments independent of the will of God we must not think of them as deriving their authority from any author at all, since to do so would, as Hooker points out, involve the notion of a super-God. We must suppose that such laws exist without an author and possess intrinsic authority.

According to Ross the moral law "presents itself to me as part of the nature of things" and I obey it "because I recognize its bindingness in itself."[11] Not only do I do so, but so, presumably, does God. But in what does recognition of the "bindingness in itself" of a moral law consist? Unless this question can be answered the whole account remains obscure. Ross's answer, in so far as he can be said to give one at all, depends on the alleged analogy between moral laws and mathematical laws: moral laws are "self-

9. *Kant's Ethical Theory*, p. 25. It is interesting to find a very similar account by a Thomist: "God's holiness consists in the fact that essentially His will can will only the Good and the Right. Thus it presupposes an eternal standard of all willing which is not subject to the free choice of God. . . ." Cathrein, *Moral philosophie*, I, p. 186. Quoted by Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, p. 586.

10. "The moral law is thought to be a set of commands which all reasonable men who possess the relevant information must concur in giving to themselves and to their fellow men" (W. C. Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals," *Philosophy*, XXV, p. 159).

11. *Kant's Ethical Theory*, p. 60.

evident just as a mathematical axiom . . . is self-evident."[12] Mathematical laws are self-evident in that contemplation of them enables us to see that they could not be false; moral laws are self-evident in that contemplation of them enables us to see that they are binding upon us. But, unless the term "self-evident" means in both cases "self-evidently true," it is simply misleading to say that moral laws are, like mathematical laws, self-evident; it explains nothing and at best merely repeats the assertion that we find them binding. On the other hand, however, if "self-evident," as applied to moral laws, does mean "self-evidently true" then, since we cannot correctly say of a command that it is either true or false, we cannot say that moral laws are both self-evident *and* commandments. (We can, of course, say that it is true or false that such and such a command has been issued, but that is another matter entirely.)

But, it may be said, moral principles do not properly take the form "Do x," "Refrain from y" but rather "X is obligatory," "Y is wrong"—where obligatoriness and wrongness are properties possessed by certain types of actions—and principles of this kind may be true and even self-evidently true. Nevertheless if moral principles are directive of conduct, and this is surely of their essence, then it must either be the case that "X is obligatory," "Y is wrong" *mean* (*inter alia*) "Do x," "Refrain from y," or it must at best be the case that "Do x" and "Refrain from y" *follow from* "X is obligatory" and "Y is wrong." Now if "X is obligatory" *means* "Do x" then "X is obligatory" can no more be said to be true or false than can "Do x"; on the other hand, if "Do x" *follows from* "X is obligatory" without being either part or whole of the meaning of the latter expression, then it must follow in virtue of some such principle as "Do always what is obligatory." But any such principle would itself be a rule of conduct. Rules of conduct thus appear to be an irreducible part of the sort of objective moral order that Sir David Ross envisages, and making the notion of such an order intelligible will involve justifying the claim that there are rules of conduct which are binding in themselves. To this latter task, however, the concept of self-evident truth contributes nothing. But unless it can be shown—and it is difficult to imagine even where such an enterprise ought to begin—that the notion of a rule of conduct which is binding in itself is a valid notion, the relationship between God and the standards of morality must remain essentially obscure.

12. *The Right and the Good*, p. 29.

The Mystery of Israel: A reply to E. Flesseman-van Leer and David W. Hay

DONALD D. EVANS

THIS Journal recently contained two articles concerning the present status of the Jewish people in God's plan for human history. Dr. Flesseman claimed for them a special status as an elect nation, in spite of their rejection of Jesus Christ.[1] Dr. Hay virtually denied them any special status whatsoever.[2] I shall try to show that both positions are inadequate, because they fail to do justice to the complexity of Paul's thought in Romans 9–11, which both claim as an authority.

It is important to distinguish the many different arguments which Paul uses in that key passage, as he grapples with the problem raised by Jewish rejection of the Gospel. I shall present these in outline.

1. (*a*) *God's freedom is expressed, not restricted, by His election* (Romans 9:6–16). Election depends neither on works nor on race, but on the prior creative call of God's mercy, which is determined solely by itself; for this reason the failure of the Jews to accept the Gospel does not mean that God's word can have failed. Only a divinely selected group of physical descendants of Abraham are heirs of the promise to Abraham: Isaac, not Ishmael; Jacob, but not Esau (that is, these individuals and their descendants). And not all who are descended from Israel (i.e., the man Jacob) belong to Israel or share as heirs in the promises. Those thus selected owe their existence to God—to His creative word or call or promise. Hence selection is prior to birth or existence and cannot depend on human works after birth; nor on physical descent as such, for this too depends on the prior creative call. This process of divine selection is not unjust, for human will and exertion are irrelevant to it, as has been shown, and so it is not a matter of human rights but of divine mercy, which is determined only by itself.

(*b*) *God's use of unwilling instruments* (9:17–24). God has in the past raised up and hardened unwilling instruments to serve His purposes, for example Pharaoh.[3] He has the right as Creator to create or select some individuals or nations for honourable use and to create and raise up others as ignoble and unwilling instruments in His divine purpose. He endures or

1. *Canadian Journal of Theology*, III (1957), No. 1.
2. *Canadian Journal of Theology*, III (1957), No. 2.
3. There are three reasons for interpreting *skeuē 'orgēs* as "instruments by which God executes wrath" rather than purely "objects of wrath": (i) the phrase appears in Jer. 50:25 where it clearly has this meaning (Denney, *Commentary on Romans* in *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, Vol. II, p. 664); (ii) there is no *'eis* as in v. 21; i.e. it is not implied that the vessels are destined to be the object of God's wrath. (Sanday and Headlam, *Commentary on Romans*, p. 261); (iii) these vessels are in fact eventually to be saved, according to Rom. 11:26.

spares the instrument whose sin really fits it for destruction, and He does so for two reasons (as can be seen in the case of Pharaoh):[4] (i) in order to show His wrath and power by mighty acts of judgment[5] and (ii) in order to make known the riches of His glory for those on whom He has mercy. Therefore, Paul implies, God may have a similar purpose in hardening Israel; He may be sparing her and using her as an unwilling instrument, and for the same two reasons. Paul applies the second reason concretely to Israel in Romans 11:11–36: Israel's disobedience has been the means to the Gentiles' acceptance of the Gospel riches.[6]

(*c*) *The saved remnant of Israel* (9:25–9). The group of people whom God now calls into existence as a community is the Christian Church which includes Gentiles and a remnant of Israel. This was predicted by the prophets, who foresaw both an extension of election beyond the original chosen people, and a narrowing of election so that only a remnant of Israel would remain.

Paul's first three arguments try to explain the contemporary situation without reference to any hope for the future salvation of Israel as a whole. In argument (c), for example, Paul thinks of the remnant primarily as a *saved* remnant, inheriting already the full privileges of the chosen people. Argument (d), however, looks to the role of this remnant in the future as a *saving* remnant, representing the whole Jewish people in mediating salvation to the Gentiles.[7]

(*d*) *The saving remnant of Israel* (11:1–7, 16–18). Paul compares the Jewish-Christian remnant with an earlier one in the days of Elijah, which had the function of carrying on Israel's heritage for future generations. The historical analogy here does not involve any stress on the idea of final salvation for the remnant, but on its saving and representative role. This is even more evident in 11:16–18, where the "root"—that is, the historic

4. The interpretation of verses 17–24 as a comparison of the past disobedience of Pharaoh and the present disobedience of Israel is not commonly stressed in commentaries. But it seems to me the most illuminating. In any case, it is not essential to the main points of this essay.

5. The Divine "patience" is often interpreted in terms of Rom. 2:4. On this view, God endures with much patience the vessels of wrath, not because He desires to show His wrath and make known His power, but in spite of so desiring. (cf. Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 261; Denney, *op. cit.*, p. 664; C. H. Dodd, *Commentary on Romans*, pp. 158–9; etc.) This view is tenable, but in the context of a comparison between Pharaoh and unconverted Israel, it seems more appropriate to interpret the Divine patience in terms of Ex. 9:15–16, where God spares Pharaoh in order to show His wrath and power.

6. Paul does not apply the first reason to Israel here, as it is not necessary to his argument. 1 Thes. 2:16 does suggest imminent mighty acts of judgment.

7. According to the Old Testament, God's redemption and revelation were to be mediated through Israel. Israel was to be God's prophet to the nations, and Gentiles would go to Jerusalem to learn the ways and laws of the God of Israel, so that through His judgments universal peace might come (Is. 2:1–4). She was also intended to be God's priest for the nations, representing "all the earth" before Him (Ex. 19:5). Through Israel, God would also exercise His kingly power over the nations; in bowing to Israel's sovereignty, they would be submitting to God's (Is. 49:23–6). Through the sufferings of Israel as God's Servant, the Gentiles would be moved to penitence and their sins would be expiated (Is. 53). To Zion, the worship-centre of the world, all nations would come for salvation (Ps. 86:9). In short, salvation for the nations depended on some sort of inclusion within the historic community of Israel.

Israel in so far as it is in Christ—supports the rest of the Church. (Similarly in Eph. 2:20 Paul speaks of the Jewish-Christian apostles and prophets as the "foundation" of the Church.)[8] The Jewish-Christian remnant was now God's saving instrument in history, acting as Israel's representative in mediating salvation to the nations.

2. So far, Paul has attempted to explain Israel's rejection of the Gospel in terms of God's over-all purposes in human history. He also considers it as a human response, or failure to respond. The problem is thrust upon him as he views the uniquely splendid religious heritage of Israel (Rom. 9:1–5). Why have the Jews rather than the Gentiles rejected Jesus Christ, when their spiritual advantages have been incomparable, and He is the fulfilment of their religion?

(*a*) *Divine hardening* (11:7–10). Paul refers to several Old Testament passages in which the prophets, bewildered by the insensitivity of God's people to God's revelation, could understand it only as being somehow caused by God Himself for some inscrutable purpose. Thus Paul shows that such humanly inexplicable sin has been characteristic of Israel in the past, and that it was prophesied for the future, "down to this very day."[9]

(*b*) *Salvation by faith* (10:9–13). The Gospel is open to Jew and Gentile alike, for both can receive salvation through it by simply responding in faith—and only in that way. In this respect, the Jew has no special advantage over the Gentile, for the terms of salvation are identical for each. This point is so constantly and so clearly stated throughout Paul's writings that it needs no further elaboration here.

(*c*) *The Law a special obstacle* (9:30–10:8). The Law, which was God's special revelation to the Jews, has provided a special obstacle for them in contrast with the Gentiles, as they respond to the Gospel. (i) It made the Cross a stumbling-stone (for according to the Law, Jesus was thereby accursed) and (ii) it led the Jews to seek status before God by works, rather than by accepting God's gift of salvation offered in Christ to be received in faith.

3. In the arguments outlined so far, Paul has tried to explain a situation in which only a small part of Israel has inherited the promises of God fulfilled in Christ, and in which the Gentiles, in growing numbers, have also received this inheritance. Already, in Paul's emphasis on the saved and saving remnant of Israel, there has been an admission of the principle that the promises to Israel as a nation have been rightly or even necessarily received by at least a representative group within Israel. Paul has, of course, maintained the equality of status of Jews and Gentiles before God in obtaining a salvation dependent on God's creative mercy and human faith-

8. Cf. Dom. Gregory Dix, *Jew and Greek*, pp. 59–60; and Erik Peterson, *Le Mystère des Juifs et des Gentils dans l'Eglise, a Commentary on Romans 9–11* (Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, no date), p. 9.

9. Cf. Mk. 4:12 and Acts 28:26–7 for the use of Is. 6:9–10, which Dodd describes as a commonly-used testimonium of the primitive Church (Dodd, *According to the Scriptures*, p. 38). In Mk. 6:52 and 8:17–18 the ideas in Is. 6:9–10 are explicitly linked with the idea of hardening, as in Rom. 11:7–8.

response: but he has qualified this by pointing out the special status and role of remnant-Israel in God's plan and purpose. If arguments 1. (*a*) and 2. (*b*) were completely adequate, Paul would have no special problem concerning Israel as a whole, and would surely present no other arguments. But in Rom. 11:11ff. he goes on to describe non-Christian Israel's special role and status in the divine economy.

(*a*) *Jewish loss means Gentile gain* (Rom. 11:11–2). Israel's rejection of the Gospel has made possible the successful mission to the Gentiles. Thus her loss is the means to their gain; her disobedience, to their acceptance. Paul saw that the prompt Jewish repudiation of the Gospel had in fact made possible its early availability to the Gentiles in an acceptable form, neither nationalistic nor legalistic.[10]

(*b*) *Eventually all Israel shall be saved* (11:11–36). Israel's stumbling has not been to a final and irremediable "fall," but to an eventual salvation.[11] Paul suggests three bases for this hope:

(i) *Gentile Salvation and Jewish Jealousy* (11:11, 14; 10:19). When the full number of the Gentiles come in, Israel will be so aroused to jealousy that she will repent and be saved. This indeed is one motive for Paul's missionary work among the Gentiles.

(ii) *The "naturalness" of Israel's return* (11:16–25). How natural it will be for the Jewish people to be "grafted" in to an olive tree whose "root" is a Jewish-Christian group. Paul's argument assumes, of course, that most of Israel is not now part of the tree, the elect community. But his point is an *a fortiori* one—if the Gentiles, "stranger to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world" (Eph. 2:12) can enter into the Christian community, how much more natural it is that eventually the Jews will enter also!

Elsewhere in his writings (e.g. 2 Cor. 1:20; Gal. 3:15–18), Paul holds that the chosen people had been narrowed down to one representative man, Jesus Christ, who fulfilled all the promises, both continuing and transforming the religious heritage of Israel;[12] there is but one way of entering into this new community—by faith in Jesus Christ—and this way is open to all; He is the foundation of the community. But here in Romans, Paul also insists on the importance of the Jewish-Christian remnant as the "root" of a tree to which it is more "natural" for Jews than Gentiles to be grafted.

(iii) *God's commitment to Israel* (11:26–9). Israel's failure to respond to God does not simply mean the end of her special relation to Him. However much Paul emphasizes the new situation created for Israel by the coming of Jesus Christ, he does not simply equate her failure with the abolition of all that her election had involved. We must examine two dog-

10. Cf. Dix, *op. cit.*, 6. 53; and Acts 18:6.

11. The word "fall" in the AV translation of Rom. 11:11(*b*) and 11:12 is misleading. RSV "trespass" is better.

12. Each of the privileges listed by Paul in Rom. 9:4–5 was thought by him to be continued in a transformed way by Christ: sonship (Gal. 3:23–9); glory (2 Cor. 3:12–4:6); covenants (1 Cor. 11:25); giving of the law (Rom. 10:4; 13:10); worship (1 Cor. 5:7; 11:23–5; Rom. 12:1); patriarchs (Rom. 4).

matic statements of faith in chapter 11, which are based on major themes of the Old Testament.

"As regards election they are beloved for the sake of their forefathers."[13] God's love for Israel as a people was sometimes expressed in terms of His love for the patriarchs, for Israel was identified with them or included in them.[14] God's choice or election of Israel was therefore sometimes explained in terms of His love for the fathers: "He loved your fathers and chose their descendants" (Deut. 4:37. RSV). For God loved the people as a whole, and as a result of this, all the individuals in the great corporate personality of Israel.[15] However much Paul opposes the notion that Israel could earn salvation through works or race, he could not merely discard the Old Testament doctrine of God's beloved people. The nation was upheld by "the immutableness of the sovereign love with which He made it."[16]

"For the gifts and calling of God are without repentance" (Rom. 11:29). The maintenance—or at least the ultimate fulfilment—of the privileges of Israel listed by Paul in 9:4–5 is assured, because God has *promised* never to reject His people in any final way:

> "If this fixed order departs
> from before me," says the Lord,
> "then shall the descendants of Israel cease
> from being a nation before me for ever."[17]

It is significant that this declaration immediately follows the famous passage in Jeremiah where God declares His intention to set up a new covenant by which Israel will be able to cast off her sin and faithlessness and return to be His holy people. Similarly, Rom. 11:27 probably means, "My side of the covenant will be fulfilled when I take away their sins."[18] That is, God's promise and His fidelity provide an assurance that He will somehow win back His people, helping them to fulfil the moral conditions required for fellowship with Him. Of course, God is not legally bound by His covenant promises, for Israel has broken her side of the covenant. His *hesed* or covenant-love, becomes like *hen*, a mercy which rests on no obligation whatsoever.[19] Yet His promises are in a sense unconditional; He does not repudiate Israel's election when Israel breaks the covenant.[20] He will punish her, more severely than others because of her greater privilege and respon-

13. Rom. 11:28, RSV. If, with Hay (*op. cit.*, p. 99) we identify these "fathers" with the Jewish-Christians, this does not destroy the claim that "Jewishness" still involves a special relation to election.

14. Cf. Deut. 7:7–8; 23:5; Hos. 2:14; Ezek. 16:1–14.

15. Cf. C. Montefiore: "It is because the community is known to, and loved by, God, that God knows and loves each individual who composes it" (in J. Jocz, *The Jewish People and Jesus Christ*, p. 309). Cf. G. Quell and E. Stauffer, under "Love," *Bible Key Words*, translated and edited by J. R. Coates, p. 16.

16. Denney, *op. cit.*, p. 676.

17. Jer. 31:36, RSV.

18. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 337. Rom. 11:26–7 is a conflation of Is. 59:20 and Is. 27:9 or perhaps Jer. 31:33.

19. On *hesed* and *hen* see N. Snaith, *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament*, pp. 127–30.

20. Cf. H. H. Rowley, *The Biblical Doctrine of Election*, p. 52.

sibility (cf. Amos. 3:2), but this is to turn her towards repentance. If God appears to have abandoned Israel, this must be merely a temporary measure. For the gifts and calling of God are beyond repentance.

As Bright has said, "Israel's God is the Lord of history; . . . history moves towards his victory, the triumphant establishment of his rule over his people. True, he called Israel to be the people of his rule, and Israel had egregiously failed and fallen under condemnation. But that fact could not in prophetic theology cancel out the victory of God, for that would be to allow that the failure of man is also the failure of God."[21]

Did Paul really imply all this background of Old Testament thought in his brief statements about beloved Israel and God's irrevocable call? If he did not, or if he interpreted God's commitment to Israel solely in terms of its being fulfilled in Jesus Christ and the "remnant," then it is difficult to understand either his problem or his additional solution in Rom. 9–11; Israel's rejection would raise no special theological problem, and there would be no special basis of hope for her eventual salvation.

Conclusions

1. Dr. Hay is correct in stressing the drastic changes which the coming of Jesus Christ makes for the Jewish people: (1) Their salvation now depends on their response to the Gospel and their entrance into the Christian community. They must now *become* members of the true Israel, the elect, the saved and saving fellowship. Outside it, they are not in actuality the elect, but the rejected. (2) By faith in Christ they can enter a new relation with God different from, and superior to, that which they have had as Jews.

2. But Dr. Flesseman is also correct in stressing the fact (which Dr. Hay reluctantly admits)[22] that there is still some relation between God and the Jewish people as such. She unwisely defines this relation in such a way as to minimize the difference between the Christian fellowship and the Jewish people, as if the latter were still the "elect" in the same way as before. But the relation, *pace* Dr. Hay, is not left utterly undefined by Paul: (1) The Christian Church has been built on a saved and saving remnant of Jews who became Christians. These Jews in part fulfil the promise of God to the Jewish people and His plan for them. And there is a special "naturalness" in Israel's finally entering the Christian community (though the Law also provides a special obstacle). (2) The commitment of God to the people of Israel is not rendered utterly null and void merely by the failure of Israel to respond. This Old Testament conviction is accepted by Paul. In the end, God will win over His people. (3) The contemporary Christian church should realize in relation to the Jewish people that they will eventually respond positively when they see unmistakably that the Christian community has in fact inherited all the spiritual blessing promised in the scriptures, and

21. John Bright, *The Kingdom of God*, p. 87.
22. *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

more. This warns us not to expect an imminent mass conversion of the Jews, but hardly—as Dr. Flesseman suggests[23]—rules out attempts to convert Jews in the meantime.

3. This continued special status of the Jewish people in the divine plan for human history raises two problems, both mentioned by Dr. Hay: (1) Does this continued special status (whether we call it election or not) possess a *character indelibilis*? The answer is surely "No," if having such a character means an impairing of either divine freedom or human freedom. Dr. Hay emphasizes divine freedom when he says, "That 'the gifts and calling of God are without repentance' . . . guarantees nothing but God's faithfulness. It is a statement about Him rather than about the Jews" (p. 99). That is Paul's argument in Rom. 9:6–16 (but not in 11:11ff). And Dr. Hay emphasizes human freedom when he says, of the Jews, "They could remain permanently in unbelief" (*ibid.*). That is Paul's assumption in 11:23. On the other hand, it is not true to Paul's thought so to emphasize divine and human freedom that no room is left for any special status. All three elements appear in chapters 9–11. It is perhaps impossible to reconcile them completely; but it is wrong to simplify the problem by omitting or denying one of them—as Dr. Hay does with special status, and Dr. Flesseman with divine freedom.

(2) Paul bases his hope that all Israel will be saved on the conviction that Israel has a continued special status. What place have Paul's special hope and conviction concerning Israel in Christian thought?

Paul's description of this as a "mystery" provides a clue. It means, on the one hand, that he claims the authority of a special revelation, a religious intuition into God's plan as revealed in Christ.[24] It does not perhaps have sufficient relevance in personal salvation to warrant inclusion as an article of faith—as was another "mystery," the resurrection of the body. And it cannot be made a dogma, as distinct from a hope, unless universal salvation be made a dogma, for it is open to similar objections. But perhaps the Church *has* erred, as Dr. Flesseman suggests, in not granting sufficient attention or authority to this "mystery."

As a "mystery," on the other hand, it is something which by nature is hidden, and which, though revealed, is not revealed in such a way that we can penetrate its full depths. In Paul's view of history there are two surd factors, two elements which do not fit into a neat monistic "philosophy of history." One is God, whom we still see only through a glass darkly. The other is the real possibility of the continuance of sin, thwarting even the purposes of God. God has the power and the will to save the Israelites, but only "if they do not persist in their unbelief" (11:23, RSV).

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 13.
24. Cf. Dodd, *Commentary on Romans*, p. 182.

[*This discussion is now closed.*—Editorial Committee]

Jeremiah and the Preacher

ROBERT DOBBIE

A I

IT is possible to preach from Jeremiah only if, first of all, remembering his spiritual stature, one approaches him with reverence, and seeks to understand the factors which determined his growth and his achievements. Foremost among these Jeremiah would have placed his call to be a prophet. This summons he construed, as Paul construed his apostolic commission, in terms of a divine purpose which antedated his own life. He defined it in the form of an inner awareness, a consciousness of a supernatural constraint which compelled him to yield to its sway. This experience, which though private is not therefore necessarily subjective or unreal, and which cannot be understood without experience of the same order, stamps him as having enjoyed direct fellowship with God, in the creative moment when he sensed and accepted his prophetic vocation.

This call, however, may be significantly related to disquieting events of his time. It may well be that the ravages of the Scythian hordes obliged him to reflect upon the legitimacy or necessity of a prophetic destiny, just as it may have influenced Zephaniah; and the possible influence of current crisis or emergency upon a resolve to preach, demonstrable in both World Wars, is not open to question, even though, as some scholars maintain, the Scythians did not constitute such a political menace as has been imagined. The Hebrew assumption that history was the arena of meaningful events and divine initiative would contribute to such a possibility. W. B. Stevenson of Glasgow University used to insist that this sensitiveness to a clamant need might well be regarded as a call to preach.

Thus by supra-historical and historical urgency Jeremiah is moved to accept a prophetic vocation.

A II

Jeremiah would claim, as the second formative factor in moulding him in prophetic wise, his frequent or constant liability to receive the Word of the Lord. As in his sense of mission, this experience of the divine and living word involved inward and outward constituents.

Inward criteria are partly negative, partly positive. The former include his consciousness of the word as a fire in his bones when he refuses to comply with its demands (20:9; cf. 23:29), and his distinction between his own proclamations and those of other prophets. They speak from visions and dreams (23:25–32); they do not stand in the inner council of Yahweh or receive a command from Him (23:18, 21, 22); they have not been sent by

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Him (27:15, 16; 28:15); they belong to the same nefarious order as sorcerers, diviners, and soothsayers (27:9–14). His positive standard of assessment is a clear certainty which expresses itself in obedience, as in his prompt response to the command to hide his linen girdle in a hole of the rock near the Euphrates (13:1–11), to put bonds and yokes on his neck (27:1–11), to buy a field in Anathoth while the capital was in extreme danger (32:6–12).

The Word of the Lord is also suggested or mediated to Jeremiah by a dialectic contact with Nature and History. Nature speaks to him of God. He resembles Brother Lawrence in his sensitiveness to the cosmic import of a budding twig (1:11f.). But more characteristically he finds spiritual suggestiveness in historic events. Grave political and national crises, like the invasion of Nebuchadnezzar, are eloquent of the inexorably moral purpose of Yahweh, though only those who already know Him can discern this significance. The religious history of Israel is full of spiritual meaning. It represents divine initiative in the call to the people; it preserves the memory of idyllic desert days of impeccable loyalty to Yahweh (2:1–3), of old ways which were good (6:16), of prophets who mediated to the people a divine imperative (26:5), and challenged them to acknowledge the claims of God. Significant occurrences, such as the discovery of the Law Book in the Temple, seemed to promise an epoch-making spiritual era. The written word became for a time a living word of God to the people, and at first Jeremiah did not seem inclined to doubt its validity in this respect.

Thus within his own soul, by communication with Yahweh, and by his interpretation of natural and historical phenomena, Jeremiah becomes aware of a real and imperious word of God addressed to him.

A III

This word was to the prophet an absolute norm by which he assessed all features of current religious life. The contemporary acceptance of modes of worship and piety as sacrosanct did not deter Jeremiah from criticising them without fear. To him they were not sanctified by antiquity or by use and wont. They were not necessarily entitled to approval because they occurred within the history of a chosen people. He regarded all contingency as subject to the moral and spiritual criteria which he found in the word of God. His prophetic function included the discerning appraisal of whatsoever was practised in the name of Yahweh. Concerning two particular sanctities he utters searing and devastating pronouncements—the Law Book which became the first Bible of the Hebrews, and the immemorial practice of sacrifice.

It is difficult to determine how far individual acceptance of the Law Book prevailed after Josiah's reform in 621 B.C. It is highly probable that any comparison of Judah, with its sacred written oracle, to Britain after 1611, fails to do justice to the priestly control over worship, if not indeed over the king. But it seems to have become clear to Jeremiah that even a nation-wide

acceptance of the Book as authoritative and mandatory did not guarantee the spiritual regeneration he sought. It gave no assurance of integrity on the part of scribes, because they falsified Scripture (8:8). The sages had no wisdom because they rejected the word of the Lord (8:9). Thus the presence of a scriptural document does not necessarily imply that it will be honoured or preserved intact. It is further obvious that the fact of Scripture, or reform initiated on the basis of Scripture, does not automatically beget conversion or renewal, for the prophet must needs prophesy still, and demand circumcision of heart and ear (4:4; 6:10). So impotent is the national attempt at religious reformation that Jeremiah cannot find one righteous man in Jerusalem in any rank of society (5:1–5). Even his own dynamic preaching, after twenty-three years of faithful witness, has not been able to move their hearts (25:3). Hence it is not surprising that the idea of a New Covenant represents the inexorable logic of his experience by its insistence on an inner moral metamorphosis, and the receipt of a new life of virtue at Yahweh's hands on the basis of forgiveness. Not the presence of Scripture, but only the activity of God, is equal to the challenge of human depravity and its wilful sinning.

More vitriolic is Jeremiah's attack upon the sacrificial habits of his generation. He denounces their naïve and credulous belief in the inviolability of the Temple, the centre of national sacrifice, maintaining that it does not provide protection to the country, and insisting that Yahweh is not necessarily bound to it, though such a faith represented current orthodoxy (7:14; 11:15–17; 12:7; 26:6, 9, 12). He ridicules the idea that the Burnt Offerings, which were regarded as so sacred that they could not be consumed by the worshippers, should be withheld from their enjoyment, and he bids those who sacrifice add such offerings to the Communion sacrifices which they consumed at festivals (7:21). He repudiates all sacrifice because it was not ordained by Yahweh when He liberated his people from Egypt (7:22); the terms of His commission involved only obedience and loyalty (7:23). He arraigns his contemporaries for their worship of the Queen of Heaven, a naturalistic worship that lacked moral restraints and sponsored vice (7:18). He rebukes them for their purblindness, which leads them to justify a combination of every kind of lawlessness with confident and arrogant appearance in the Temple, and with the claim that such wickedness is the destined end of their deliverance at Yahweh's hands (7:8–11).

A IV

The content of Yahweh's Word as it comes to Jeremiah relates to history, to the conduct of the nation and of the individual. It presents an indictment against the nation as a whole, the professional leaders, the rank and file of the people, Judah, small groups of Judeans, and individuals. Specific religious charges are made against worshippers. They are guilty of apostasy (14:10); they forsake the covenant (5:28; 9:4–6; 16:10–13); they are disobedient to the divine word (7 and 26), whereas the Rechabites are

obedient to their commission (35:18); they deny Yahweh's power to punish (5:11–13); they are given to idolatry (11:12), and to incense-burning (32:29). Moral condemnation relates to the sacrifice of children in the valley of Hinnom (7:31; 19:4–9) and to a wholesale rejection of social righteousness (5:1–5), including the enormity of enslaving again those who in a national crisis had been set free (34:8–16). Professional impropriety is found in the prophets (5:30–31; 14:13–16; 23:9–14, 26–32), the scribes (8:8), the priests (5:31; 23:33), King Zedekiah (24:8–10), and those who remain with him in Judea (29:15–19). In virtue of all this wickedness, nemesis is about to fall upon the land and nation.

The divine word, however, also speaks of mercy after punishment, provided the guilty repent (18:8; 26:3, 13; and especially 3:12, 13, 22, and 4:1–2). This mercy will express itself in the restoration of the people (16:15; 23:7–8; 24:6; 27:22; 29:11–14; 30:10–11; 32:36–44; 33:6–9; 46:27–8) and in the appointment of good "shepherds" (23:3–4). It is a manifestation of the divine love and faithfulness (2:1–13), which so essentially characterize Yahweh that He cannot punish without causing pain to Himself (12:7–11; 31:20). Its most significant and creative achievement will be the establishment of a New Covenant, the differential marks of which will be a direct fellowship with God on the part of men who have experienced His forgiveness (31:31–4), and in their lives demonstrate their loyalty to His constraints. This Covenant, through obedient response to divine and saving grace, will consummate the purposes of Creation and of History.

B I

Jeremiah assumes that prophecy is a charismatic function. It represents a divine imperative as to vocation, a divine endowment as to its fulfilment. Since it uncompromisingly presupposes the supernatural, it is not reducible to any form of humanistic service, which finds its inspiration and its end in finite or human values. Nor is its accomplishment guaranteed by any heredity as to religious office; membership of a priestly family, or of a family which has given birth to prophets, does not of itself assure a call to prophesy, or a God-given word to deliver. Only within the ambit of a divine constraint is prophecy either legitimate or possible. It is therefore the necessary correlate of prophetic mysticism.

The recognition of this mysticism is an indispensable precondition of understanding Jeremiah, and of preaching with relevance from him. To expound him without knowledge of the type of inner religious experience which made him a prophet, is to be guilty of interpreting him in a non-prophetic or scribal manner, similar to that employed by the Rabbis in relation to Scripture which they regarded as inspired, although they themselves had not experienced such inspiration as its composers knew. The prophet thus compels the preacher to examine his own credentials of vocation, to confess that he may not preach from prophecy unless he can preach prophetically, with the knowledge of an inward personal constraint.

Objection may be made to this apologia for prophetic mysticism as an indispensable pre-requisite of the preacher in any age, on the ground that his essential function is to interpret Scripture, which records, in addition to personal awareness of God, saving deeds which represent His purposes amid national and individual life. It would, however, seem difficult if not impossible, to construe these deeds as a manifestation of God unless one knew Him by acquaintance, and not merely by observation. Thus the understanding of Scripture would appear to presuppose that very experience of God of which the prophet speaks, and the preacher who was innocent of such prophetic mysticism would lack the means of right discernment of the Word of God.

A more serious objection to this mode of arguing may be that the Christian preacher is called to interpret Jesus Christ, who, in terms of divinity, cannot be understood within the orbit of human analogy or human experience. It is doubtful, however, how far this reasoning is cogent or this thesis acceptable. Any faith which acknowledges the full humanity of Jesus is obliged to conceive his spiritual mastery or finality in terms of awareness of his Father's will, and obedience to its demands. Even if the difference between His awareness and obedience and ours is such that it becomes a difference of kind and not of degree, the mode of awareness and of fellowship must be identical in His life and ours. Hence it is neither irrelevant nor presumptuous to contend that it is both salutary and necessary for the preacher to be a mystic in the prophetic sense, and that this equipment is required for a proper insight into Jesus. He can therefore be more discerningly interpreted if He is approached from the vantage point of an appreciation of the prophetic call.

A different demurrer to this emphasis contends that the preacher can receive his commission only within the Church, and therefore is not entitled to claim direct supernatural authentication for it. In like manner, it is maintained, the validity of his call depends upon its endorsement by the Church to which he belongs. This argument, however, confuses source and medium. While it is true that the Church constitutes the space-time milieu in which the preacher grows in faith and piety, it is not true that he is totally conditioned by its ethos. His primary contact, indeed, in reality if not in point of time, is not with the mundane or terrestrial at all: it is with God, or, on the supposition of Christocentric rather than Theocentric mysticism, with Christ. To deny the validity of this supernatural contact is to exclude the possibility of a church by renouncing its ultimate determinant.

It would consequently seem both legitimate and necessary to maintain that in preaching from Jeremiah one must begin by accepting the charismatic nature of one's call and function.

B II

Jeremiah claims to preach the Word of God. The Christian who preaches from him regards him as communicating or representing this same divine

Word, even though, because of his faith in the final revelation of God in Christ, he cannot accept it as a total or absolute expression of that Word. Does its incompleteness therefore constitute error or untruth in it? Can Jeremiah then be preached autonomously, or only within the ambit of the Word as it is in Christ? What is the Christian validation of Jeremiah's Word, so that it can be proclaimed now?

This validation cannot depend upon the fact that his word is now designated Scripture. The judgment that it is Scripture represents the verdict of the Church, and whether true or false it does not alter the character of his word, or make it express or embody more of God than it actually does. Hence its authentication must be inward, not outward. It follows that Jeremiah cannot be preached merely because he is found in Scripture: this would be tantamount to maintaining that he may be preached because the Church sanctions such proclamation.

Nor is it legitimate to contend that the Word of God as proclaimed has power to fulfil its purpose, and that therefore the presentation of it as it is in Jeremiah will *ipso facto* be effectual unto salvation. The Old Testament believed that the word, human or divine, had power of accomplishment in itself. One residue of this conviction is found in the belief that when "The Word" is uttered, one indispensable condition of the establishment of the Church has been realized. But this conception of the word—whether taken within or without the orbit of Scripture—is false to the facts of prophetic experience. The prophets were more disregarded than revered; it was not true that their word was irresistibly potent. If it had been so, such grim realities as the exile might not have come to pass, and the prophets would not have suffered hostility from all ranks of society.

The validity of the prophetic word must therefore depend—for Jeremiah as for us—on the measure of truth and insight it portrays. This means that the criterion of judgment cannot be the mode of apprehension or awareness, so long as the inter-personal relationship between man and God is not impugned. It is rather, of necessity, the content of his message, deriving from a real fellowship with God. In part its validity lies in its dialectical relevance to current history. Part of it is determined by the fact that it is morally regenerative in character, as the prophet's obedience to it indicates. In some measure the testimony of the prophet must be accepted, that he is moved by the imperiousness of a Personal constraint through a Word whose givenness is to him beyond dispute. Not unimportant is the fact that his word is still able to stir the souls of men. Its creativity, in repentance and conversion, involves a dynamic energy which is not evident in contemporary religious life, and presupposes a divine intrusion of judicial and redemptive character.

The questions which arise concerning the content of Jeremiah's word, whether it is true in itself, and whether it is true in relation to Jesus Christ, may both be tested by reference to the correlation of judgment and mercy in his conception of God.

That judgment is an inescapable element in life, an essential attribute of deity, is clear in the teaching of Jesus, and is suggested by the testimony of experience. According to Jesus, we are judged as we judge, we receive what measure we give; condemnation attends, not only the outward sin, but also the disposition which makes it possible; the Kingdom escapes those who do not sacrifice eye or hand rather than persist in sin, and it will be taken from the chosen people and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits of righteousness. In principle this judgment is not different from that which Jeremiah announced. The fact of it—whatever mode of its execution was envisaged—and the intrinsic dependence of it upon the character of God and the way He has made His universe, are self-evident to both. Judgment, as a manifestation of God's moral purposes, accompanies iniquity *pari passu.*

This conviction is abundantly justified by the evidence of life. The correlation of erroneous, unwise, or sinful living with disastrous consequences, in broken health or disease, in personal estrangement, in scarcely resistible tendency to sin, in distaste for the eternal and the divine, all imply a concomitant judgment upon human perversity and wrong.

But Jeremiah maintains that mercy accompanies and may be a correlate of judgment, and a prerogative of God. This also is true in the convictions of Jesus and the witness of life. The fact of Jesus, his summons to repentance, his ministry among the unreclaimed and outcast, his self-identification with the prodigals and reprobates, his power to refashion the morally lost, all testify to the fact of a divine clemency which mingles judgment with mercy, not as two incongruous or incommensurable entities, but as two aspects of one re-creative purpose, which is ever concerned to transform men into true sons of God. To this principle of redemption or restoration life bears ample testimony, in the fight of the body against disease, in the power of love to reconcile, in the fact that punishment or nemesis can be a means of discipline or grace, in the instinctive cry of the heart to God in the hour of dereliction or tragedy. While Jesus demonstrates a new power in the remaking of men and women, the principle of compassionate service was established long before His day; it is one expression, as it is one result, of the agony of Jeremiah's soul. He recognized—and we may therefore confidently preach from him—the regenerative principle of the Gospel, which in its judgment and its mercy is integral to the very constitution of the universe and of God.

B III

Jeremiah's attack on the Temple and on Sacrifice raises the question whether and to what extent his indictment can become part of a Christian proclamation within an ethos of sacramentalism, mediation, and priestly authority.

Jeremiah's position would seem clear. He believed in a natural or intrinsic sacramentalism, in which both Nature and History could suggest truth, and

therefore be a means of Grace. He rejected the idea that any agreed or conventional symbol, such as an offering, could establish proper relationships with God, or impart new life to the soul. This intrinsic sacramentalism, common to many mystics, would not seem logically, however it might appear pragmatically, to leave room for a conventional sacramentalism, yet this latter is the central fact of Christian sacramental worship. Not a little of the difficulty of accommodating the Lord's Supper to a tradition of experience of the Presence of God is to be seen in the diversity of interpretation to which it has been subject. It has been construed as primarily or exclusively a memorial feast; as also expressing an eschatological hope; as conferring a blessing in virtue of the participant's faith, and at the same time because the spiritual body of Christ is extended in the elements; as involving the metamorphosis of the elements, in substance if not in form, into the actual body and blood of Christ, by means of the priestly blessing, so that *ex opere operato* they impart grace to the worshipper.

The causes of this developing or variegated interpretation are not less significant of the perplexity caused by a disinclination to accept the fact of direct fellowship with God. These causes are in the main threefold.

(1) The New Testament writers received an ungracious heritage in the form of disbelief in the possibility of direct communion with God. The prophetic legacy of such intercourse was construed as a revelation in the past. A growing belief in divine transcendence, which made necessary such intermediaries as angels, the *Shekinah*, the *Memra* or Word, and made impossible any belief in a direct personal disclosure of God, was accompanied by the abandonment of a prophetic, and the adoption of an apocalyptic conception of history, in which fulfilment of the divine purposes depended less on human, if chosen, agents, and more on the autocratic and independent activity of God. Thus between Jeremiah and the New Testament, Hebrew tradition lost one of its most precious beliefs—the belief that, like the prophet, one could stand in the inner council of God, and be constrained by His will.

(2) An increasing emphasis on the Church as the society of those who found salvation in Christ, so that it could be claimed empirically that "Extra ecclesiam nulla salus," was followed by a false deduction from this phrase, to the effect that salvation could be found only by attachment to the church. Definition of the Church in terms of its Sacraments, or of the Word and Sacraments, resulted in an exaltation of the Church as the agency which mediated God to men, and even claimed the authority and the right to deny His grace to sinners. In this way, it might be legitimately maintained, the Church took precedence of the Kingdom of God. The fallacy inherent in this trend is manifest from the fact that one does not speak of the Sacraments of the Kingdom. In addition, it is not without significance that most evangelism does not appear to resort to a sacramental approach to potential converts. The outstanding exception of the Puseyite movement but serves to emphasize the fact that the evangelical appeals of Wesley and Whitfield, of

Moody and Drummond, of Studd and Andrews and Sundar Singh, and of Billy Graham, do not in any way present or imply sacramentalism as a constitutive factor in the rebirth of souls. May not Jeremiah then be right in his assumption that it is not necessary for their growth?

(3) This mediating office of the Church became intensified as a result of a growing sacerdotalism, which, quite apart from the question of its possibility, denied the right of the individual to direct fellowship with God, and limited his spiritual resources to such institutional aids as were clerically sanctioned. But any sacerdotal control contradicts the fact, involved in Jeremiah's experience of God, that part of the Old Testament at least testifies to the reality of such communion, and implies that it may not be regarded as outmoded by the claims of any category inconsistent with it. In addition, it would seem legitimate to contend that the knowledge of God vouchsafed to Jeremiah and his peers does not become invalid in virtue of the crucial words of Matthew 11:27b: "Neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him," or the corresponding words in Luke 10:22b: "No man knoweth . . . who the Father is but the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal Him." It may not even be irreverent to wonder whether these verses do not represent the application of a sacerdotalizing process to Jesus Himself.

Baptism, Passover and Eucharist

DAVID W. HAY

THIS review-article has two purposes. One is to take notice of a splendid work on the sacraments that deserves to be widely read and studied: Neville Clark's *An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments.*[1] The other is to take serious issue with the author's handling of the Passover and to make some suggestions on problems that arise.

A statement by a Baptist in one of the Lund volumes might well set off by way of antithesis the standpoint from which Clark writes:

> The fact is that there is no group of Christians anywhere to whom the ordinances are as utterly destitute of meaning from the standpoint of saving efficacy as they are in the thinking of the Baptists. To us the ordinances are not sacraments; that is, they are not vehicles of grace.[2]

If Neville Clark, himself a Baptist, has read this affirmation, he must have shuddered as he did so. His book has a richness of sacramental teaching that is in marked contrast to the saying just quoted. His emphasis is upon the sacramental, the sacrificial and the corporal. One can not help asking which line of thought represents the genuine Baptist position and what this clash portends for the ecumenical scene.

The first three chapters give us a treatment of baptism in the light of modern scholarship that would be hard to better for balance and insight. He relates baptism in the Synoptics to its Old Testament background as initiatory, ethical, eschatological, and universal (p. 10). Like Cullmann he finds the key to the baptism of Jesus in Jordan in the fusion of the concepts of Messiah and Servant (p. 14). The obscurity of the references in all four Gospels to the practice of baptism by Jesus and his disciples is given a suggestive theological light in terms of their concern with the "real" baptism of Jesus on the Cross.[3] The baptism in Jordan is only a partial fulfilment of John's rite. "Christian baptism remained an impossibility until in death Jesus had fulfilled his baptism for all men" (p. 19). The baptism of the Spirit, prophesied by John, became possible and actual at Pentecost. "Christian baptism has been inaugurated" (p. 19. Cf. on the Fourth Gospel, pp. 27f.).

Although much awaits solution in the relation of water-baptism to the outpouring of the Spirit, Clark argues with strength that they are inseparable. Regarding *Acts*, in which the Spirit is the *fons et origo* of the Church, two generalizations are safe. (1) Baptism is the outward manifestation of a

1. Neville Clark, *An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments.* London: S.C.M. Press, 1956 (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 17). Pp. 96. $1.65.

2. R. Claibourne Johnson in *Ways of Worship*, ed. Edwall, Hayman and Maxwell, pp. 142f.

3. The whole subject is discussed in relation to the writings of Cullmann, Flemington, Lampe, Dodd and many other scholars, British and Continental.

believing response to the Gospel,[4] and, as such, the appointed rite of initiation into the Church, and (2) it is connected with cleansing and forgiveness and the reception of the Holy Spirit (p. 21). Clark feels that these attitudes are still too reminiscent of John the Baptist. The profounder meaning emerges only in St. Paul, with whom the primary meaning of cleansing becomes "overpowered by the connection made by Jesus between baptism and the cross" (pp. 22f.). Paul made this truth potent by identifying the Spirit with the Spirit of Christ. "The Galatians are reminded of what the putting on of their garments after baptism really signifies" (p. 24). To be in the Spirit is to be in Christ, and this means to belong to the Church. Clark quotes Bultmann with approval: " 'In Christ' . . . is primarily an ecclesiological formula" (p. 24).[5]

Part of Clark's good service is to show how integral to Paul's theology the sacrament of baptism is. It is often in Paul's mind even when there is no more than an aorist tense to show that this is so (p. 25: e.g., Rom. 8:15, with Gal. 3:2; Gal. 5:24; Col. 3:3). "There is little doubt that the New Testament view of baptism is of a rite that is effective rather than merely symbolic" (p. 32). It unites us with Christ by giving us "entry into the Church which is his resurrection body" (p. 30). There is some confusion of expression on this valuable page, where Clark is expounding with an excellent spiritual realism the meaning of Christ's *body*. The statement just quoted needs to be reconciled with this other one: "The Church did not create the sacraments: rather are the sacraments perpetually creative of the Church" (p. 84). The heart of the matter is the truth that union with Christ is impossible apart from the unity of Christ which is his total body (p. 33). As we might say, baptism is not just a doorway. It is the house also.

One must confess to a strong feeling of tedium as once more in Clark's book one is taken through the minutiae of the question whether the last supper was a Passover or some other kind of meal. No doubt there is cause for admiration at the spectacle of how much detail is known and can be adduced by New Testament historians regarding times so remote from our own. But on the other hand the almost complete uncertainty as to how much weight is to be allowed to each *pro* and *con* and the conjectural character of many of the considerations advanced appear to render worthless any decision made on their basis. In this controversy it is interesting to compare Clark with another scholar, A. J. B. Higgins, who has written a book in the same S.C.M. series with the title, *The Lord's Supper in the New Testament*. Higgins supports the thesis that the last supper was a Passover. A main purpose of Clark's work is to oppose Higgins by name on this point. Like Higgins, however, Clark rejects *kiddush*, Passover-*kiddush*, and *haburah*-meal as fitting the occasion. One begins to hope that we shall cease to be troubled with these so-beggarly suggestions as antecedents for the eucharist.

4. The hint of R. Claibourne Johnson in this statement could have been obviated by reversing the order of the points.

5. Cp. also and much earlier C. A. Anderson Scott, *Christianity According to St. Paul*, pp. 154ff.

But surely in Clark's proposal that the actual antecedent is an ordinary Jewish meal we have reached the very nadir of the whole process. Before taking issue with this conclusion, let us call attention to the excellent structure which Clark builds upon this seemingly unpromising foundation.

The very meagreness of this beginning enables Clark to demand that we do not "underestimate the transforming impact of the creative personality of our Lord" (p. 48). It is certain that, whatever our Lord started with, he gave it a new meaning in terms of the revelation that he brought. To put the matter in more Biblical phraseology than Clark's, we should say that the eucharist is the great example of the prophetic function of embodying revelation in signs. The fellowship meal of Jesus with his disciples "was something more, something new; made new, made different, because for the first time filled with a richer content and a deeper meaning" (p. 61). " . . . This means, at the very least, that the last supper and thus the eucharist is through and through sacrificial in implication and significance" (p. 63).

Rejection of the sacrifice of the mass has well-nigh occluded the power of thought upon this matter in the Protestant world except in an *ex parte* way. Clark's book, one may hope, will give a strong impulse to the re-examination of this subject, already well under way, so that on the one hand medieval error may still be rejected and on the other a recovery may be made from the impoverished teaching that is so widespread. Oddly enough, the commonest Protestant understanding is largely that the eucharist is "an ordinary meal" with religious overtones. Clark will have it that the eucharist, after the transformation at the last supper, is not at all now an ordinary meal, but essentially a sacrificial one. We may recall St. Paul's teaching that the bread and wine carry a transformed reference to the flesh and blood of a slain animal (1 Cor. 10:21 and context). As Clark says, "What was done once for all in historical actuality at Calvary, was done proleptically in the upper room, is done memorially at each and every eucharist" (p. 62). A suggestive page following this statement contains an insistence, well argued, that the word *memorially* must be given its full Biblical meaning, which is quite different from the thin modern notion of remembering. "Henceforth when the disciples 'do this' it will be for the bringing of Christ Crucified out of the past into the present, for the 're-calling' of his sacrifice before God, thus making it here and now operative" (*ibid.*). At this point again the place of the Lord's *body* has to bulk large in our thought. Clark does well to avoid the partial understanding of St. Paul's remark about "discerning the Lord's body" which finds here only a reference to the Church. While that meaning is emphatically present, it depends upon the more fundamental fact that the bread means Christ himself, and that in partaking of it the Church becomes one with his resurrection-body.

A chapter on *Agape and Eucharist*, which looks at the New Testament evidence and also discusses the disappearance and re-appearance of the *agape* in early times, is designed to draw a parallel between the meal within a meal in Church usage and the similar double character of the last supper.

The closing chapter, *Towards a Theology of the Sacraments*, is replete with suggestion. "Four basic questions emerge—the question of creation and redemption, the christological and trinitarian question, the ecclesiological question, and the eschatological question" (p. 73). Clark gives excellent pointers to show how much is lost by failure to have a relevant doctrine of creation. In the trinitarian question, a right understanding of the Ascension is crucial (p. 75. Cf. p. 56). The ecclesiological question means rightly enunciating "the relationship of identity and distinction between the crucified, the mystical, the sacramental and the glorified body of the Lord" (p. 79). The eschatological question, which is kept well to the fore throughout the book, may be indicated in his earlier appealing words: "Because they (the baptised) have risen with Christ, the eucharist is possible. Because they await the resurrection, the eucharist is necessary" (p. 35). These are only sketchy indications of the contents of a very rich chapter.

One regrets offering criticism of a book that offers more wealth than has even been named. But Clark's handling of the Passover is so inadequate that one cannot leave the matter untouched. It is legitimate to hold, as many New Testament scholars do, that the last supper was not a Passover. But in view of the fact that the Passover is featured so prominently in the New Testament in connection with the last supper and Calvary, it is theologically purblind to thrust it into the background as Clark does. If the last supper was not a Passover meal, we should at least feel compelled to make use of Clark's principle of "the transforming impact of the creative personality of our Lord" to account for his filling the occasion with paschal meaning. Perhaps Clark, contrary to the implications of his own principle, has been too much dominated by historical considerations. He seems also to have felt that the Passover would stand in the way of a sacrificial interpretation of the last supper. For he refers to Dalman and Gray in a note (p. 63) and reminds us that "the passover was connected neither with sin-offering nor atoning sacrifice." But he might have quoted the latter in a place where he throws another light on the matter. For in discussing the "P" document Gray also says that "broadly speaking, the sacrificial system as a whole is expiatory: all sacrifices in Ezekiel, the blood of all sacrifices in P expiate."[6] The sacrificial Passover brings every sacrificial act into view and plays into the Saviour's hands as he erects the new temple of his own sacrifice.

Fulfilment of the Jewish revelation must be our starting-point in understanding the work of Jesus. This is Higgins's starting-point, on the first page of his first chapter. In rebuttal of regrettable remarks by Clark about Higgins's scholarship (p. 36), we must say that Higgins shows a better historical understanding here. It is not good enough to attempt to solve the problem whether the last supper took place on the Passover evening or not in terms of lesser, even though relevant, considerations of chronology and usage to the neglect of the quite major consideration that our Lord, with explicit and deliberate intention, brough his ministry to its climax at the

6. G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament*, p. 76.

time of and in direct connection with the Passover festival.[7] This fact is itself a known *historical* one, and a heavy *onus probandi* lies upon anyone who may desire to break or loosen the connection. Yet Clark not only rejects the "last supper = passover equation," as he calls it, on the temporal issue but also consistently plays down the significance of the Passover for our understanding of the Lord's last days on earth.[8] Higgins, on the other hand, very clearly sees the historical and theological parallel between Exodus-Passover-Holy People of the Old Testament and "Exodus" (Luke 9:31)-Eucharist-Church of the New Testament. The weakness in Clark's position shows very markedly in the facts that, accepting what he believes to be the Johannine chronology, he makes no serious use of the theological—that is, the paschal!—meaning of this chronology, and at the same time offers us no theological reasons and insufficient historical ones for what he believes to be the Synoptic variation.

To the reviewer, his handling of Higgins's treatment of the historical considerations is far from demonstrating his case (pp. 41ff.). Readers may form their own conclusions. Only one feature seems worth mentioning here, namely, the alleged contradiction in St. Mark's account. Mark reports that the chief priests and scribes decided, or at least did not want, to arrest Jesus on the feast day, "lest there be an uproar of the people" (Mark 14:2). The problem was not one of the unlawfulness of an arrest on a festival day (vide Clark, p. 41f.), but simply one of the danger of a tumult leading to trouble with the Roman authorities. We may, like Clark, be unimpressed by the explanation taken by Higgins from Jeremias that the words, "not on the feast (day)", mean "not in the presence of the festal crowd" (p. 42). But there is another and quite simple explanation. At this point in the narrative, the priests and scribes do not know that they are going to have the assistance of one of Jesus's inner circle. When Judas unexpectedly turns up, they *gladly* accept his help (14:11). The significance of their gladness should not be missed. Mark does not mean to say, as has been thought, that the arrest did not take place on the feast day. He means to point out that Judas solved the problem of the priests and scribes by enabling them to make the arrest *secretly*, without any danger of a popular uproar. In the event, the arrest could and did take place on the Passover evening, as Mark affirms.[9]

7. Plain statements should be plainly read: Mark 14:12ff. (cf. Matt. 26:17ff.; Luke 22:7ff.); John 11:55; 13:1.

8. Again and again Clark refers to what he calls the "background" of the Passover, without drawing its significance, as he ought, into the centre (cf. pp. 48, 52, 54f., 63, 64, 70). The last reference is the most revealing, where he banishes to a mere footnote the observation: "This is the point at which the passover background becomes relevant for the understanding of the last supper."

9. It is fair to point out that Jeremias envisages the explanation here adopted. On the assumption that the decision was taken not to arrest Jesus during the feast, he asks the question: "How do we know that the decision of the Sanhedrin was implemented? For it was taken before Judas had offered to play the traitor, which provided an unexpected opportunity of arresting Jesus at the very time of the feast" (*The Eucharistic Words of Jesus*, p. 47). The expression, "not in the presence of the festal crowd," may or may not be a good rendering of Mark's words, but it does express what was in the mind of the Sanhedrin. Mark 12:1 prepares us for what actually happened. The arrest was made during the feast but not before the crowd. The Sanhedrin achieved their "ruse."

If this conclusion supports Higgins and those who accept the "last supper = passover equation," so also do some things that should be said regarding the Fourth Evangelist. Unfortunately Clark does not give us enough on this matter. Satisfied with his attempted demolition of Higgins's use of the Synoptics and "John," he adds: "The Johannine chronology is not disputed by St. Paul and is supported by Jewish and perhaps by early Christian tradition" (pp. 43f.). This is insufficient support for a chronology that has its own difficulties.

The two major points in this connection on which John differs from the Synoptics are his omission of the institution of the eucharist and his timing of the Lord's death to coincide with the killing of the Passover lambs. No satisfactory reason has yet been offered why such a markedly sacramental writer should have omitted the institution of the eucharist. His reason—historical or theological or both—must have been of major proportions to make it impossible for him to recount the institution on the night upon which he depicts the meeting between Jesus and the Apostles. May it not be that, while he makes the occasion sacramentally as suggestive as he can, he does not recount the institution because everyone knew it did not take place until the next day? It might be retorted at once that this argument applies *a fortiori* to any change in the day of the crucifixion. But the logic of the situation does not lead to this conclusion. For the Church would readily appreciate the symbolical and theological motives of the author in timing Christ's death with the killing of the lambs. Being themselves free from a barren historical "literalism," they would not expect the author, for the reason of mere consistency with such literalism, to change the date of the last supper also. He therefore does not claim that the eucharist was instituted on the day before the Passover, and seemingly omits the institution.

But it is actually an error to assume (as for the sake of argument we have momentarily assumed) that John gives us no account of the institution. His account is contained in the sacramental words: "But one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and forthwith came there out blood and water" (19:34. Cf. Clark, p. 56). In the nature of the case, this act could not be made to coincide exactly with the hour at which later in the day the Passover would be eaten. But John's mention of it here supports the contention that he makes no claim that the eucharist was instituted on the previous evening. The truth that Clark sees so clearly with respect to baptism (p. 28) applies also to the other great sacrament. For John, *they are both instituted on the Cross.* In particular, the fulfilment of the Passover is the institution of the eucharist. Instead, then, of suggesting, as we did a moment ago, that John refrained from giving an account of the institution on the previous evening because he had no "literalistic" impulse to do so, it would be better to insist that the Crucifixion is itself the institution and the incident of the spear is the sign of it. The hour had come. The death of the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world is the "true" preparation of the "true" Passover (19:14, 31), which can now be eaten

(1 Cor. 5:7).[10] This interpretation reinforces Clark's own desire to identify the last supper and the eucharist with Calvary. Whatever attitude may be adopted, two things at least should be acknowledged: firstly, that John's timing of the Crucifixion should probably be taken in relation to his "omission" of the institution; and, secondly, as a *minimum certainty*, that a sacramental writer who of set purpose made this "omission" must be regarded as designedly repudiating any intention of claiming that the eucharist was instituted on the evening of the day before the Passover. His positive intention, we have suggested, it to say that the true Passover could not be eaten before the Lord's sacrifice was made. If this be so, the unanimity with which all four evangelists insist upon the identity of the eucharist with a fulfilled Passover is accompanied by a unanimity in their timing of it.

In general we may suggest three conclusions. The first is that Clark is abundantly justified in fastening upon sacrifice as the major theme of the last supper and the eucharist. If the meaning of liturgical action as *action* is really to be understood, we must cease thinking of the Lord's Table as the place where we receive the "benefits" of Calvary, as if Calvary and eucharist were two separate events related as cause and effect. We must rather see the Table as the place where through the Eternal Spirit—

> We here present, we here spread forth to Thee
> That only offering perfect in thine eyes,
> The one, true, pure, immortal sacrifice.

If on the one hand we must avoid a wrong notion of repetition, we must also on the other hand, ceasing to be affrighted by medieval ghosts, refuse to make a wrong division. Indeed, the medieval error is that "repetition" makes this division. The Protestant error has been to continue it.

Secondly, we must allow full weight to the New Testament emphasis upon the role played by the Passover. Christ's sacrifice marks God's covenant with and calling of a new people. The divine action took place and became revelation in connection with the Passover and its transformation. What is joined together in the divine action must not be sundered in our theologizing.[11] Thirdly, the controversy upon the question whether the last supper was a Passover meal or not must be reduced to its proper proportions. Most of all it is necessary to insist that conclusions upon this issue be not allowed to determine our theology of the matter. For the theology of the matter, that is, what our Lord purposed in his action, is a major part of the historical event itself. If the New Testament, in its very capacity as historical documentation, has not reliably informed us on this point, discussion of subsidiary matters is worthless.

10. John 13:29; 19:14, 31 all show that the Passover is still to be eaten. Is John perhaps saying that the death of the Lamb of God is the "preparation" of the Christian Passover? Taking these texts to refer to Passover preparation in conjunction with the fact that John does not claim that the eucharist was instituted on the evening before the Crucifixion does away with the problems discussed by Higgins (p. 22) and Clark (p. 43).

11. See J. J. Enz, "The Book of Exodus as a Literary Type for the Gospel of John," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXVI, Part III (September, 1957). Enz does not deal with the Passover type, but his ample evidence strongly reinforces the position here adopted.

Book Reviews

Economic Problems of the Church from Archbishop Whitgift to the Long Parliament. By CHRISTOPHER HILL. Oxford: University Press, 1956. Pp. xiv, 367. $6.50.

THE THESIS of this work is that behind the Puritan attacks on the Church of England "there lurked economic considerations, appealing especially to the interests of land-hungry magnates and of business men great and small." The book seems to drag at first as the author has to establish the fact that the church was sadly plundered in the Reformation era and he does so with an overwhelming amount of statistical data. Once this fact has been sufficiently underlined, the story begins to move along more smoothly as the writer describes the various schemes devised to relieve the consequent poverty of the clergy. Some of them have a familiar ring and would seem to indicate that even our modern age has not hit upon anything very novel in the way of raising money for the church. Fees for the priest's blessing during pregnancy or 4d. for a licence to eat meat on statutory fish days may have fallen into desuetude, but establishing a differential in pew rents, such as occurred at Stepney parish (*c.* 1632), where occupants of pews were to be placed "according to their several ranks and qualities," is not yet an altogether archaic practice. This injunction at Stepney, however, was not the result of a sudden outbreak of class consciousness but was devised in order to obtain more revenue from the wealthier classes.

All these ingenious methods to raise money for church purposes were the result of the breakdown of the medieval tithing system. Tithes, as Professor Hill points out, originally paid in kind, presuppose a subsistence economy, but in a commercial economy a contribution of one tenth from a cash revenue can appear as an intolerable burden. In point of fact the commercial expansion of the sixteenth century had so increased the value of tithes that there was bound to be a scramble to share the wealth now flowing into religious institutions, especially as the plunder of the church after the Henrician Reformation had become an acceptable national pastime. Also the sanction behind tithes had been seriously undermined by Protestantism "by its stepping down the status of the priest." Since the priest was no longer the indispensable mediator between man and God, payment of tithes could be regarded a statutory duty rather than a moral compulsion.

Because of the plundering and wealth sharing there was need, when Laud became Archbishop of Canterbury, for a drastic financial reorganization of the church; but there was, as our author points out, the knotty question: "Which element in society should control and profit by that reorganization?" The civil war in England was fought in part to settle this problem. But like most wars it settled few problems; rather it intensified them. What happened

was "that men of conviction, Laudians as well as radicals were defeated," to be followed by an age of latitude and occasional conformity.

Laud's policy, which ultimately led to his execution, was to secure a well paid clergy on a graded scale, but he was also interested in achieving an independent clergy by setting them free from financial pressure on the part of laymen. Puritans were in agreement with Laud on the need of increased clerical stipends and they also agreed that this might be achieved through the purchase of impropriations (ecclesiastical property granted to laymen or lay corporations), but where discussion took place it was upon the question who was to have the disposal of the vast revenue that would come to the church through such purchases. If Laud and the government controlled the new fund then there would be one kind of church polity; if on the other hand the Puritan gentry had control there would be another kind of church polity. In this controversy there was much to be said on both sides. Our author quotes Gardiner as saying that "of all modes of supporting clergy yet invented, their maintenance by a body of capitalists living for the most part at a distance from the scene of their ministrations is, in all probability, the worst." But the other alternative advanced by Laud (again in the words of Gardiner) "involved cold hard pressure of official interference."

Enough perhaps has been said to indicate the economic problems that are the concern of the book under review. At times it would seem that the author verges on Marxism in his stress upon the economic factors in church reform; but he quite clearly saves himself from such an accusation in his concluding chapter, for he admits that he has limited himself in his study to the economic effects of the rise of capitalism upon church life; but he is aware that other motives such as "the strength of Puritanism as a religious faith, the strength of English patriotism and the passion for constitutional liberty" also played their part in undermining the old Medieval church.

This book serves two purposes: it is an excellent introduction to the civil war in England and it has a contemporary reference in that it points up the great difficulty in securing an independent and prophetic ministry in either free or established churches.

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Tertullian's Treatise on the Incarnation. The Text edited with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, by Ernest Evans. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1956. Pp. xliii, 197. $6.50.

De carne Christi is the first of two closely related treatises aimed by the "Father of Latin Theology" at the heresy of Marcion and kindred denials of the fleshly reality of Christ's manhood. Written at the point in Tertullian's

stormy career when he was coming under Montanist influence (A.D. 207–212 is the range of likely dates), it does not reflect the peculiar preoccupations of Montanism, but shows its author in his capacity as one of the major defenders of orthodox Christianity against the widespread movement commonly referred to as "Gnosticism." It would, in fact, be hard to find a more succinct, lively and readable introduction to the Church's first great, desperate struggle against heresy.

Canon Ernest Evans, to whom we owe this elegant edition, is one of the ablest students of Tertullian in the English-speaking world. For twenty-five years vicar of a little Yorkshire parish, he has contributed similar editions of two other works of Tertullian, as well as a translation of St. Augustine's *Enchiridion*, to the long succession of distinguished productions of English clerical scholarship. In the present volume, he gives us a fresh critical text, paralleled page by page by an English translation, preceded by a full introduction and followed by extensive and learned notes.

It is impossible here to attempt a proper assessment of Dr. Evans' Latin text. By and large, his readings are conservative; it is possible, for example, to go through entire chapters without finding any verbal departures from Oehler's Leipzig edition of 1854. Dr. Evans has, it is true, taken into account the important twelfth-century *Codex Trecensis* (discovered in 1916), though with less unreserved enthusiasm than other recent editors, and he has made careful use of Kroymann's Vienna *Corpus* edition of 1942, so that his conservatism is enlightened. Moreover, he has provided an *apparatus criticus*, judiciously abridged from Kroymann, which makes the more important textual evidence readily accessible. But he has decided (rightly, I think) against most of Kroymann's conjectural emendations, and his own conjectures are few and far between. Certain points, of course, are open to criticism. We may wonder, for instance, why on p. 20, l. 47, he prefers his conjecture, *credo*, to the dominant MS. reading, *crede*. Or we may note gaps in the *apparatus*, as at p. 6, l. 11, where evidence is given for the rejected reading only, so that we have to turn to a note on p. 92 to find the basis for the text as printed. But in the end we must be grateful for a handy and reliable working text.

The translation combines accuracy with readability, and a number of its renderings are quite brilliant. For example, the translation of *ne fascinet puerum* (p. 6, 1, 12) as "lest she put the evil eye upon the boy" gives just the right sense of the briskness of Tertullian's argument at this point. Again, inevitably, there are certain minor lapses. The too breezy rendering of *quod unctionibus formatur* (p. 12, l. 11), "that he is licked into shape with applications of oil", followed by the rather precious translation of *despuis* by "bespittle", is too much of a contrast. The phrase *utriusque substantiae census* (p. 18, l. 38) is rendered in one way in the translation and explained quite differently in the notes (p. 109). In his treatment of the parenthesis, *plane prophetis aliquo gloriosiorem* (p. 52, l. 34), both in the translation and in the note (p. 144), Dr. Evans assumes too readily that *gloriosus* means

"vain-glorious," although other translators have taken it to mean "glorious" and still have managed to make good sense of the passage. All these, however, are small criticisms of a more than competent piece of translation.

The thorough introduction begins by relating the treatise to Tertullian's other writings and continues with a full outline of the argument, in which its kinship with the classical *suasoria* is brought out. This is followed by a discussion of the relation of the Incarnation and Resurrection in early Christian thought and an account of the Marcionite heresy. The introduction concludes with a survey of the text-tradition and a note on the use of the important terms, *natura*, *conditio*, *condicio*. Dr. Evans, in my view, deals too summarily with the vexed question of Marcion's relation to Gnosticism, and obscures the real parallels by his oversharp contrasts. I am also doubtful of some aspects of his treatment of *natura*, which he seems to me to interpret in too fixed and abstract terms, with the result that he is embarrassed by at least one passage (p. 56, l. 12: *non materiam sed naturam*) where the word is used in a more flexible and "Augustinian" way (cf. note, p. 152). But one questions Dr. Evans' judgment in such matters at one's own risk.

The commentary consists of a lucid outline of each chapter, accompanied by detailed, full and useful notes. One might wish for a comment on the famous passage from Chapter 5, often misleadingly summarized in the phrase, *credo quia impossibile*, and one may think that the relation of the argument of Chapter 17, with its parallel between Eve and Mary, to the thought of Irenaeus would have been clarified if *Adv. Haer.*, III, 22:4 (Massuet's divisions), had been quoted and not merely noted in passing, and if reference had also been made to V, 19:1, with its description of Mary as *advocata* of Eve. But it is ungracious to ask for more when so much has already been given.

The reader who has even a smattering of Latin will find that this first-rate volume provides him with a rare opportunity of making close contact with one of the most vigorous minds of early Christianity, while the introduction and translation deserve the attention of an even wider range of readers. It is to be hoped that the reception and circulation of the volume will be such as to encourage Canon Evans to place us still further in his debt.

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The Old Religion: An Examination into the Facts of the English Reformation. By J. L. C. DART. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1956. Pp. xii, 210. $3.50.

BY THE TITLE of his book Canon Dart affirms that Anglicanism is in all essentials the "old religion" of the English people. He argues persuasively, and with constant use of historic evidence, that the Church of England is

not a new institution which was created at the Reformation, but that "it maintains the ancient Faith, continues the historic ministry and administers the Catholic sacraments."

In common with all Anglican apologists since the sixteenth century the author holds the profound conviction that there can be a non-papal Catholicism. Such a system of belief and practice, deeply rooted in the apostolic age and developed through the formative centuries of Christian history, he finds in the Ordinal and in other parts of the Book of Common Prayer. In general terms he commends the Anglican reformers for preserving this Catholic heritage while rejecting later medieval abuses, and he calls history to witness to the wisdom of the decisions which they made.

After demonstrating that reformed Anglicanism is in fact the old religion still, he proceeds to show that in some respects modern Roman Catholicism is a new religion, responsible for "several startling novelties in doctrine." Among these novelties he lists the dogmas of papal infallibility, and the immaculate conception and assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. As for the confessedly new religions of Protestantism Canon Dart is disposed to be as critical of the official formulation of a number of their doctrines as he is of those teachings of Rome which add to the ancient faith of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church.

In his preface the author writes: "This book is not anti-anybody or anything. It is not written to attack the faith, or the customs of men who are not members of the Church of England." *The Old Religion* is thus, by implication, designed for domestic use, with the aim of explaining the faith of their Church, as the writer conceives it, to Anglicans who are ignorant of its meaning and origin. The book is straightforward and dogmatic in presenting its material, and it may well assist in strengthening the convictions of those whose ecclesiastical loyalty is weak. But since it is also controversial it is sure to arouse queries and objections in the minds of many readers. *The Old Religion* shows little trace of that ecumenical thinking which inspired the words and deeds of such great churchmen as Archbishops Temple and Garbett. Using the Prayer Book as a criterion it dubs as disloyal and even traitorous the "Protestant and Broad Church parties" although none of the members of this ecclesiastical "fifth column" (p. 187) are identified and none of its doctrines are clearly defined. One gains the impression that the only loyal Anglicans are those who believe what the author believes, a position which is manifestly open to challenge.

Canon Dart makes a strong case for the basic contention of his book. He weakens his case by overstatement and by departing from that balanced reasonableness which from the days of Richard Hooker we have learned to expect from Anglican pens.

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A Stubborn Faith: Papers on Old Testament and Related Subjects, Presented to Honour William Andrew Irwin, edited by EDWARD C. HOBBS. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956. Pp. xii, 170. $4.00.

THIS SLENDER VOLUME contains eleven essays by former students of W. A. Irwin, in acknowledgment of his distinguished services to O.T. Scholarship. A foreword gives a sketch of Professor Irwin's career, and an appendix details his major publications during the period 1925–1955.

Many facets of Biblical enquiry are reflected in the impressive variety of themes considered by these writers.

R. J. Williams of Toronto discourses with erudition upon "The Fable in the Ancient Near East." In all but one instance he uses translations of his own from Sumerian, Akkadian, Egyptian, Aramaic, Hebrew and Greek sources to maintain the thesis that "a highly developed fable tradition" (p. 24) is to be found in the Ancient Near East, and that it influenced subsequent development of the fable: The Mesopotamian, e.g. influenced the Aesopic Corpus and thence the Reynard the Fox cycle.

Grace Edwards of Milwaukee-Downes College analyses the Exodus motif in prophetic and post-prophetic writings, maintaining that "the profoundest interpreters of the Exodus were not the prophets nor the prophetic historians, but the nameless authors of the tradition which bridged prophecy and apocalyptic" (p. 37). The moral attributes of a covenant God accomplished at the Exodus a deliverance which involved alteration of the course of nature, the destruction of Israel's foes, and emancipation of Israel; this event led to faith in its recurrence.

Edwin R. Thiele of Emmanuel Missionary College argues for the existence of co-regencies in Israel and Judah, partly on Egyptian analogy, partly on the evidence of 1 and 2 Kings. He cites 2 Kings 8:16, which states that Jehoshaphat was King of Judah when his son Jehoram came to the throne. He finds double dating in the narrative of Joram's succession in Israel: in the 18th year of Jehoshaphat (2 Kings 3:1), and in the 2nd year of his son Jehoram (2 Kings 1:17). He claims that Jeroboam II of Israel had 12 years of co-regency, and that this explains the excess of 12 years in the regnal total of Israel over Judah at Amaziah's death, and the excess of 12 years in this total for this century as compared with the chronology of contemporary Assyria.

W. S. McCullough of Toronto sets in perspective the views of the "Enthronement of Yahweh" Psalms from Mowinckel to Terrien. He examines the assumptions of the Mowinckel School—that there was in Israel in preexilic times a New Year festival, and that there was a common religious Cultic pattern in the Near East, by which Israel was influenced. He demurs to these claims, and himself offers a threefold thesis: that in Israel the New Year was traditionally associated with rites of contrition and atonement: that prophetic thought in Israel conceived of Yahweh as cosmic but never as bereft of his powers: and that there is no evidence of Yahweh being

enthroned at a New Year celebration, a view indeed which would have contradicted Israelite theology.

C. F. Kraft of Garrett Biblical Institute writes on the strophic structure of Hebrew poetry. He argues that "the unit upon which the attention should be centred is the combination of 2 or 3 stichoi into the line (or verse)" (p. 68): parallelism must be related to carefully planned strophic structure. Evidence of the latter is cited from Hebrew and Ugaritic The strophic is predominantly triad, but freedom exists within their respective lines. Grouping of strophes into stanza structure is not found, nor is any absolute correspondence of thought and form.

W. G. Williams of Iliff School of Theology suggests that Jeremiah's vision of the Almond Rod does not concern a newly blossomed tree but Aaron's rod which budded (Num. 17:2ff.). Jeremiah revolted against the interpretation of the rod given to him in his training for the priesthood, as is seen in 8:8 when he arraigns scribes who misinterpret the Law, and 31: 31–4 which implies that men's knowledge of God and forgiveness from God dispense with the priestly mediation of Torah and of pardon by sacrifice.

H. G. May of Oberlin College considers "some historical perspectives," pleading for a realistic, non-tendentious interpretation of Israel and her kings: a reconstruction of her history devoid of myth and legend. He applies this desideratum mainly to David and Zedekiah, and then to the Pharisees and Jeremiah.

Harry M. Orlinsky of Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion writes on the present state of the Textual Criticism of the Judean Biblical Cave Scrolls. He denies any relation between the Scroll text of Isaiah and the Hebrew which underlay the LXX, and asserts that it had nothing to do with the Hebrew Vorlagen of Targum, Peshitta, and Vulgate. Likewise the Isaiah Scroll published by Sukenik is in fundamental accord with the Masoretic Text. Orlinsky then analyses the readings of Ecclesiastes 7:19 (Qumran Scroll), Micah 1:3, and the text of part of 1 Samuel, 1:2, and Deuteronomy 32.

R.B.Y. Scott of Princeton analyses the concept of the service of God. The basic Hebrew verb means "to work," and to perform sacred rites. The latter "produced a historic institution of Biblical religion" (p. 136). Self-identification with deity was expressed by gift or communion sacrifice. The prophets in their indictment of the cult are "establishing priorities, not discussing alternatives" (p. 138). Temple ritual must be sincere: the cult is always secondary: true worship is of the heart. The O.T. teaches personal commitment. The cult is necessary for the community's relation with God.

W. A. Beardslee of Emory University compares the work of Harnack, Nygren, Cullmann and Bultmann, in an attempt to identify the distinguishing features of early Christianity. Harnack stresses leading Christian ideas—the Kingdom and Fatherhood of God, the value of the soul, the supremacy of love. Nygren emphasises Agape, "God's spontaneous love for those who have no claim to value" (p. 147). Cullmann makes primary the history of

salvation, God in Christ inaugurating a new time in which victory has been won by the death and resurrection of Christ. To Bultmann God's act in Christ is not in history but is the end of history. "There can never be a historically available disclosure of God: if there were, it would deprive man of the necessity of choice" (p. 151). The major conclusion of this enquiry is that Christianity cannot be expressed in ideas; its centre is in God's action, in his encounter with man by Christ.

E. C. Hobbs pleads for a scrutiny of the message of the Evangelists in the Gospel narratives. Noting the limitations of the biographical and dogmatic interpretations of Christ, he insists that the historical and critical method must be used to determine the contribution of the gospel writers to christian tradition.

These essays are all stimulating. They demonstrate the intellectual alertness of current O. T. scholarship, and open up numerous vistas of Biblical enquiry. An adequate review would necessitate competence in all the relevant fields of Biblical research, but two items of criticism may be offered.

The claim of W. G. Williams that Jeremiah's vision concerned "a rod or twig of almond rather than a tree" would seem to falsify the Hebrew text, which describes the twig as the rod of an almond tree. It is true that *maqqel* can be used of a rod without specific reference to the tree from which it came, as in the sense of a staff for journeying (Gen. 32:11, Ex. 12:11, 1 Sam. 17:40), or the symbolic staves of Zech. 11:7, 10, 14. This occurs also in its synonym *matteh,* which may refer to a traveller's staff (Gen. 38:18, 25), Moses' rod (Ex. 4:2, etc.), the magician's rod (Ex. 7:12), the rod of oppression (Is. 9:3), and so on. But Jeremiah's language seems to imply a close connection of branch and tree. The further view of Williams that this vision came to Jeremiah while he was in training for the priesthood assumes his priestly training, which would not seem demonstrable from the material at our disposal.

R. B. Y. Scott seems to regard the phrase "with what?" in Micah 6:6 as implying an offering: "the act of worship in the sanctuary is taken for granted" (p. 138). May it not rather be, however, that Micah's formulation in 6:8 involves the *rejection* of such offerings as he specifies, and the substitution for them of moral and spiritual grace? When, further, Scott regards the prophets as maintaining that the cultic service "will always be secondary" (p. 139), he does not supply evidence for this claim. The prophets nowhere suggest that cultic worship has a secondary sanctity. Whatever the reason for their indictment of current sacrificial practices—reasons associated with Canaanite corruption, magical coercion of deity, the substitution of works for faith, and of ceremony for morality, the absence of divine imperative concerning such an ordinance, the fact that they have no relation to Yahweh—nowhere would it appear that the prophets of the 8th Century and Jeremiah ascribe a secondary role to sacrificial ritual. They never plead for its refinement. Their conception of religion seems rather to imply its rejection.

This apart, however, these essays are intriguing. They display erudition as notably in R. J. Williams, a spirit of combative enquiry (not least in Orlinsky's defence of M. T. and his strong demurrers to the third edition of Kittel), a discernment which begins by assuming that scripture may be more right than has often been thought (as in Thiele's fascinating analysis of chronology), and a perspective which can pass sober judgment upon the scholarly minds of our time. But our gratitude for this stimulating survey should incline us to pay reverence to the teacher who has inspired the labour of these his former students, and challenged them by his own independent enquiry not less than by his "stubborn faith."

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The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. By ETIENNE GILSON, with A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works, by I. T. ESCHMANN, O. P., translated by L. K. SHOOK, C.S.B. New York, Toronto: Random House, 1956. Pp. x, 502. $8.00.

THIS VOLUME is a translation, with a few revisions and additions, of the fifth edition of *Le thomisme* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), together with an important and useful "Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works" by Fr. Eschmann, of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto. In view of the growing interest of modern students in things Mediaeval, and particularly in the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas, the appearance of this work in the English language is an event of considerable importance, for it is without doubt the fullest and most reliable discussion available of the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor.

Readers who are familiar with other works by Professor Gilson will recognize at once that his use of the word "Christian" in the title of this volume is not without special significance, a significance which he has often elaborated and defended, and clarifies once more in the "Introduction" to this work. The point he seeks to establish at the outset is that St. Thomas created his philosophy "only for the sake of the service it renders Christian wisdom" (p. 7), and that it is a theologian's philosophy. This is not to say that St. Thomas indulges in "theologism"—surely no one has formulated more explicitly than he the formal distinction between philosophy and theology—but it is to say that the philosophical issues he raises, and the conclusions he reaches, although completely justified in terms of natural reason alone, are suggested and guided by the aims of the Christian Doctor. In fact, Gilson claims, St. Thomas' *personal* contribution to philosophy is included in what he himself calls the "revealable" (p. 442, n. 27): i.e., truths which are naturally accessible to the human reason (as, for instance, the existence of God) but which have in fact been revealed because they are truths necessary to man's salvation. "In *becoming something revealable* philosophy does not

give up in any way its essential rationality but it agrees to ordain its rationality towards a higher end" (p. 24). It is in the discussion of "revealable" truths that most of St. Thomas' philosophical teaching is found, and it is here too that his originality is clearly apparent. Professor Gilson, in attempting to be true to the intention of the Angelic Doctor, does not try to separate out from the works of Aquinas purely philosophical elements to construct a purely philosophical system, but follows St. Thomas' own theological order. Thus, the volume is divided into three major parts: God, Nature (Creation, Angels, The World, and Man), and Morality.

In the realm of the "revealable" the primary problem is that of the existence of God. In addressing himself to this problem, St. Thomas, the Christian Doctor, "elaborates a new metaphysics of being, renovates the philosophical notion of God and, consequently, the whole philosophy of nature, inasmuch as it hangs on the notion of creation, whose implications deeply affect the structure of the traditional morality" (p. 23). In elaborating his new metaphysics of being, argues Gilson, St. Thomas went far beyond his predecessors; so much so that "in entering the doctrine of St. Thomas, the metaphysics of Aristotle has received an entirely new existential meaning" (p. 43). While we may readily concede that Aquinas does not merely repeat Aristotle, we may well question whether his philosophy of the "act-of-being" is so radically new as Gilson claims. Can it really be argued that "Aristotle . . . never made the distinction between what substances are and the fact that they are" (p. 90)? Although this appears to be Averroes' understanding of Aristotle, it is contrary to numerous Aristotelian texts which clearly distinguish between the *that it is* and the *what it is* (e.g., *Posterior Analytics*, II, 1), and is certainly contrary to Aquinas' own interpretation of Aristotle (e.g., of *Metaphysics* 1003^a 33 ff.).

"Let us agree to call 'essential'," says Gilson, "every ontology or doctrine of being for which the notion of essence and the notion of being are equivalent" (p. 33). In these terms, is it accurate to treat Plato as a sheer essentialist because "for him there is only being where intelligibility is possible" (p. 48), while according to Gilson himself, the act-of-being "can only be grasped by or in the essence whose act it is" (p. 368)? According to Gilson, the whole philosophical and theological tradition (developed on the basis of several varieties of Platonism) before St. Thomas is to be interpreted in terms of "theologies of essence" (pp. 48ff.). This thesis may readily be granted in application to the argument of St. Anselm's *Proslogion* (although the philosophical intention of this work is now very much in question), but it is surely much less convincing in application to St. Augustine and to Mediaeval Augustinianism generally. The difference between Aquinas and his predecessors in the philosophy of being is not a matter of radically different kinds of philosophy (and certainly nothing like the kind of difference one finds between "essential" and "existential" philosophies in modern times), but of more or less clarity in the distinction between essence and existence, and of more or less emphasis upon the act-of-being within this

composite. Gilson himself seems to recognize this point later on, when he says: "What characterizes Thomistic ontology . . . is not so much the distinction between essence and existence as the primacy of the act-of-being, not over and above being, but within it. To say that Thomistic philosophy is 'existential' is to stress more forcibly than usual that a philosophy of being thus conceived is first of all a philosophy of the act-of-being" (p. 370).

Throughout the pages of this volume and in the extensive notes (more than fifty pages) there are discussions of, and allusions and references to, many controversial issues (Augustinian-Aristotelian debates of the thirteenth century, the knowability of God, the relation of soul and body, the possibility of a critical epistemology, etc.) which the author has argued more fully elsewhere; but perhaps the most refreshing and illuminating section of this most illuminating book is the section on morality, and especially the chapter on "The Religious Life" (pp. 333ff.). There is here a sharp criticism of those Thomists who hold for a purely natural moral philosophy (cf. p. 490, n. 26), and no room is left for those who still suppose that St. Thomas holds a kind of "two-storey" theory of nature and grace: "There is no sense in pretending to arrive at natural virtues by separating them from grace, in a doctrine in which grace, by healing nature, actually makes nature capable of having virtues" (p. 343). What Augustinian could disagree?

In a brief review of so large and important a volume as this, one cannot hope to do more than indicate a few of the author's most characteristic theses. The book must be read carefully from beginning to end by all who are interested in the thought of the greatest among the many great Christian philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages. This task is made easier by the fact that this work is accurately and lucidly translated by Fr. Shook, clearly printed and well bound. The notes offer extensive bibliographical information and valuable commentary: it is a pity that they have not always been brought up to date, and that references to Patristic and Mediaeval authors (particularly St. Augustine and St. Anselm) are almost always to the *Patrologia latina* rather than to the modern critical editions. Fr. Eschmann's Catalogue (pp. 381–437) is a masterpiece, and a nearly indespensible tool for every serious student of the works of St. Thomas.

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Old Priest and New Presbyter. By Norman Sykes. Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: Macmillan), 1956. Pp. viii, 266. $5.50.

In this long-anticipated study, one of the most eminent students of modern English Church history tackles the vexed question of "episcopacy and presbyterianism since the Reformation with especial relation to the Churches of England and Scotland." Dr. Sykes' basic thesis is that of his booklet, *The*

Church of England and Non-Episcopal Churches in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, but the argument is expanded in scope and extended in time and generously illustrated by apt quotations, which more than justify the author's hope that he has "offered some new items of information" (p. vii).

As Dr. Sykes surveys post-Reformation Anglicanism, he sees in its treatment of Church order "a typical Anglican norm" (p. 175), according to which episcopacy is retained and honoured on various grounds, historical and practical, as of the *bene esse* of the Church. As an historian, he finds in this view the authentic expression both of the *via media* and of the longer and broader history to which Anglicanism appeals, while as an ecumenist he thinks that it fosters a reasonable and hopeful approach to the problem of reunion. One can only respect this latter motive, whatever may be thought of its effect on Dr. Sykes' treatment of some aspects of Anglican history. But as I see it he has failed to make out a case for his historical interpretation, which means that, whatever classical Anglicanism's ecumenical contribution may be, it is not what Dr. Sykes thinks it is. Neither the details of interpretation nor the total shape of his argument lead us convincingly to the *bene esse* theory as the Anglican norm.

The difficulties begin with Dr. Sykes' choice of "The Godly Prince and the Godly Bishop" as his starting-point. It is not that the "prince" was not important for a strong body of theologians, whose views contributed to an intimate interweaving (not to say, confusion) of royal and episcopal authority in Tudor Anglicanism. But the notion of the sovereign as arbiter of ministerial order is strikingly absent from Prayer Book, Articles and Ordinal, and it is fantastic to say that "the particular form of polity established by the godly prince in the church of England was set forth in the Preface to the Ordinal" (p. 11), when in fact that Preface appeals directly and solely to the Church's practice "from the Apostles' time." As it is, the godly prince's disappearance from Dr. Sykes' story, once he has performed his assigned task of illustrating the *bene esse* view of episcopacy, indicates that he does not mean much for the history as a whole. Dr. Sykes would have made a better start at the job of making sense of the complex continuity of Anglican thought on the subject if he had taken more seriously the Ordinal's assertion of apostolic origin as the common root of the enduring types of Anglican teaching about episcopal order. (All this is apart from the limitations of his treatment of the godly prince himself, whom he presents with no reference to the pre-Protestant background in Henry VIII's quasi-Byzantine imperialism or to any other factors in the making of the complex institution of the royal supremacy.)

In Chapter III, "An Imparity of Ministers Defended," Dr. Sykes gives a conventional and quite full account of the "Caroline" apologetic, but with questionable emphases and peculiar omissions. For example, he repeatedly stresses the effect of exclusive presbyterian claims in provoking an episco-

palian reaction, with only a passing reference (p. 69) to the important influence of patristic tradition in the Stuart period. In this connexion, it is noteworthy that he nowhere mentions John Pearson (one of the weightiest divines of the age), either as the author of *Vindiciae Ignatianae*, to which the patristic argument for episcopacy owed so much, or as the clear exponent of a rigorist doctrine of episcopal ordination. But then, if he had not ignored Pearson or cavalierly dispensed himself from quoting "the works of Francis Mason, Henry Hammond, Bishop Robert Sanderson, Archbishop James [*sic*] Bramhall, and Herbert Thorndike" (p. 68), he could not have said so simply that the Anglican divines' "positive, constructive, and consistent apologetic" held episcopacy to be "not of dominical but of apostolic appointment, and as *divino jure* only in that sense" (p. 81). As the evidence collected on pp. 42–46 of my *Episcopacy Re-Asserted* shows plainly, a line of writers, from Bilson and Hooker to Maurice, affirmed not only the apostolicity but also the ultimate divine authority of episcopacy much more sharply than Dr. Sykes' casual summary would suggest; here, as at several other points, the summary statements hardly do justice even to the evidence submitted. Again, in discussing the plea of necessity commonly advanced by the Carolines on behalf of the Continental non-episcopal churches, Dr. Sykes fails to quote the important qualifying passages—notably Bramhall's comparison of a non-episcopal church with an unbaptized Christian—which help to define the kind of "churchmanship" conceded, and by this failure does less than justice to the real coherence of the ecclesiology of the authors whom he is expounding.

In Chapter VI, "The Times of Ignorance," one of the most instructive sections of the book, Dr. Sykes discusses the relation of the English Church to foreign Protestants, with a fairly full account of the work of Lutheran ministers in Anglican missions in India. Having rightly noted that Archbishop Wake's policy of approving the reception of the Eucharist in foreign reformed churches by Anglicans went beyond the agreed practice of the seventeenth century, he gives a fair cross-section of Hanoverian opinion on Church relations, matching quotations from Hoadly, Wesley and the Evangelicals with others from Law, Horne, Jones of Nayland, Daubeny and Van Mildert. But once more, in his attempt to "attain the highest common factor" (p. 175), he fails to give due weight to the explicit statements of the high churchmen; as a result, his conclusions are loosely related to his evidence, and the real continuity of Anglican thought from the Elizabethan age through the Oxford Movement is obscured. All this is made easier by his narrowly English standpoint, which allows him to overlook the parallel testimony of the American theologians, from Samuel Johnson of Connecticut to Bishops Hobart and Ravenscroft. Thus the stage is set for the expected criticism of the "innovations" of the Tractarians, without which no defence of *bene esse* is complete.

In Chapter VII, "Giant Pope," Dr. Sykes digresses to give us an excellent

account of Anglican-Roman relations from the Reformation to the Oxford Movement, with special emphasis on Sancta Clara's attempt to reconcile the Articles with Trent and on Wake's dealings with the Gallican leaders. This survey should help many Protestant readers to a fuller understanding of the bi-polarity of Anglican ecumenical aspirations.

In his final chapter, Dr. Sykes ends his survey and points the moral. He asserts the novelty of the Tractarian view of episcopacy as of the *esse* of the Church, without regard to his own quotations from the older high churchmen (let alone the mass of untouched evidence), and makes no attempt to account for the fact that high churchmen like Godfrey Faussett, who became bitter opponents of Tractarianism, upheld Newman and his colleagues in their teaching of apostolic succession. When he goes on to criticize the "Tractarian" position in the light of early Church history, he does little better, partly because he writes too briefly and relies too fully on secondary material of uneven value. Thus, in chastening the writer of *Tract 15* (as well as the present reviewer) for neglecting the alleged evidence for presbyterian ordinations in the Alexandrian Church, he rests heavily and uncritically on Telfer's highly speculative treatment of the question; similarly, he accepts Molland's view of Irenaeus' episcopal consecration, without noting Ehrhardt's later discussion. All in all, the sketchy treatment of the early evidence contributes nothing to Dr. Sykes' main argument.

We must not, of course, exaggerate the importance of the main question at issue in this book; despite Dr. Sykes' claim that "the apologetic position of a church . . . placed in the strait of seeking to repudiate nearly four centuries of its history . . . would be hardly reassuring or sound" (pp. 260f.), it is Scripture and Antiquity, and not Anglican history, to which the "typical Anglican norm" appeals for verification and correction, and it is on these standards that Anglican ecumenical policy must finally be based. But in fact Dr. Sykes is a long way from proving his interpretation of Anglican history. If he had simply tried to validate the *bene esse* doctrine as *a* traditional interpretation of the Anglican Church's basic formularies and historic position, the value of his contribution would have been beyond dispute, but to claim exclusive standing for it as the Anglican norm is another matter, and there are too many gaps in the evidence and instances of special pleading in interpretation for Dr. Sykes' statement of the case to be accepted as proof of any such claim. There may well be a genuine unity in the development as well as in the origin of Anglican views of the Christian ministry, but it is not the simple kind of unity which Dr. Sykes has tried unsuccessfully to sketch. What he has really given us is his own "tract for the times," interesting, informative and stimulating, but nonetheless inconclusive.

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The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. By HANS HOFMANN. Translated by Louise Pettibone Smith. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders), 1956. Pp. viii, 269. $4.75.

IF ANY STUDENT of modern theology should be inclined to deny to Niebuhr the title of Systematic Theologian he would find a supporter in Niebuhr himself. He does not claim to be a student of theology in any strictly academic sense. The greatness others attribute to him as a Christian thinker does not lie here. It is to be found rather in his persistent attempt to relate the truth of the Christian Gospel to the actual life of twentieth century man. He once wrote of himself:

> Since I am not so much scholar as preacher, I must confess that the gradual unfolding of my theological ideas has come not so much through study as through the pressure of world events. Whatever measure of Christian faith I hold today is due to the gradual exclusion of alternative beliefs through world history.

It is because of this insistence on keeping Gospel and world in continuous dialectical tension that Niebuhr has come so often under the fire of Continental theologians of Barthian persuasion. They accuse him of an anthropological bias which leads to a perversion of biblical truth. Niebuhr's supporters, on the other hand, attribute to him the coveted merit of making the Christian faith relevant to every facet of modern man's political, economic and social life.

The author of the work under review is a competent scholar from the Continent who has studied in several celebrated centres of theological education in Europe under such men as Barth, Brunner and Bultmann. His study of Niebuhr's work has led him to a deep appreciation for the contribution to ecumenical Christian thought of this most influential American theologian. He is constrained even to defend Niebuhr from the charges brought against him by his critics, both at home and abroad, although he reserves the right to hint at critical questions of his own. Hofmann makes this high claim for the subject of his book: "No serious Christian, holding a position of responsibility in either Church or secular order, can justify pursuing his work without taking into account Niebuhr's truly prophetic message."

The aim of the book is to disclose, through a careful analysis of Niebuhr's writings, the underlying motif of his thinking and to show how the method and content of Niebuhr's theology have grown out of his conviction that Gospel and world must be held in inseparable relation by the Christian man whom God has set in the world as mediator between Himself and society. Examining each of Niebuhr's books in chronological order, the author demonstrates the dialectical relation that exists between Christian truth and social analysis in Niebuhr's thinking from the beginning and shows how each has led to a profounder understanding of the other.

Niebuhr's vocation as a Christian thinker began when, as a young minister of an industrial parish in Detroit, he discovered that the "liberal theology" in which he had been trained as a student for the ministry could not be brought into a realistic or meaningful relation with the society in which he lived and worked as a pastor. Nor could he find in any of the competing, often self-contradictory, secular philosophies of modern times an illuminating word that did full justice to man's greatness and his plight. Thus the young minister was driven through confrontation with the world to a fresh examination of the Scriptural witness to an historical revelation. There, with the aid of the Fathers of the Church, Augustine in particular, he found a transcendent Word of God which alone could make sense of the life of individual and social man in its actuality.

There can be no doubt, as the author points out, that the Continental revival of biblical theology profoundly influenced Niebuhr in his reassessment of the Christian faith; especially is this the case with the work of Emil Brunner. But Niebuhr, unlike most Continental theologians, is an "analytic" rather than a "synthetic" Christian thinker. His unique contribution lies in his genius for social analysis, a gift recognized and appreciated by outstanding social philosophers who do not share his faith, and in his deliberate attempt to wed Biblical Word to the concrete problems of modern man.

Readers who are already acquainted with Niebuhr's work will find in this book an extremely useful guide to the discovery of the essential unity and coherence of his thought as the author traces the development, in breadth and depth, of themes present in his earliest writings. There are also here and there throughout the work in formative comparisons between Niebuhr and other contemporary theologians on questions to the fore in contemporary theological discussion.

Ministers and lay students who are not as well acquainted with Niebuhr's contribution to modern thought as they would like to be—or as they should be, if our author's assessment of his importance is accurate—will find here a most helpful introduction. The book's clear analysis of the central issues and intent of Niebuhr's work cannot help but be a guide to an understanding of it.

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The Middle East: Its Religion and Culture. By Edward J. Jurji. Philadelphia, the Westminster Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1956. Pp. 155. $3.00.

We live in friable times, when across the world not only are prosperity and peace and political stability and life itself threatened, but also humane understanding and goodwill and charity seem precarious. In the Middle East is focused much of the tension that may disrupt both the outward

institutions and the intangibles of man's life. Any work that promises to contribute anything at all to better understanding and more goodwill with regard to that area cannot but be welcomed.

The present study sets forth to make such a contribution. And it proclaims, rather resoundingly, in its Foreword and opening chapter, a thesis that readers of this *Journal* will presumably not be so blind as to deny: namely, that peace within the Middle East and relations between it and outsiders, such as the West, are questions basically of moral and cultural and religious matters. The book thereupon proffers a description of such matters, with chapters on Islam in the area (to all intents and purposes the Arab world), on Judaism there (largely the Jews' place in mediaeval Arabdom), and, getting most space, Christianity (the indigenous Oriental churches, the Orthodox, the Roman Catholic, American Protestants). The material is not new, nor is it marshalled into any discernible pattern. In fact, this reviewer was unable to make out just what the point of the book really is, except perhaps to draw attention to the multi-faith character of Arab life, to provide information about some of it, and to show American Protestants one way in which they are potentially involved.

The study is neither challenging nor revealing, but it is informative and is written with goodwill in an area where informed goodwill is all too scarce.

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Mystery and Philosophy. By M. B. FOSTER. London: S.C.M. Press, (Toronto: Ryerson Press) 1957. Pp. 96. $2.50.

Metaphysical Beliefs. By S. E. TOULMIN, R. W. HEPBURN and A. MACINTYRE. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press) 1957. Pp. 216. $5.00.

THESE TWO VOLUMES are the most recent additions to the Library of Philosophy and Theology which is devoted to the very necessary task of relating these two disciplines in their contemporary forms. This is all the more desirable in view of the fact that philosophy and theology appear to have been travelling along completely separate paths for the last quarter of a century.

The form of contemporary philosophy known as linguistic or logical analysis has as part of its background a radically anti-theological positivism. Fortunately this position has been abandoned by most analytical philosophers who now see their task as one of describing and classifying all the various ways in which language is used, including the religious. Modern theology, for its part, has tended in the past to dismiss the whole school of analysis as a modern version of the worst type of logic-chopping scholasticism. Nowadays, however, some theologians are beginning to realize that they

can no longer ignore the challenge to theology, on the score of meaning and logical status, that is coming from their philosophical colleagues.

– The four authors represented in these two volumes are all professional philosophers, well-versed in linguistic analysis, and at the same time Christians, keenly interested in theological questions. In *Mystery and Philosophy*, Michael Foster questions not the practice of analysis, which he regards as the correct philosophical method, but the assumption, characteristic of this school, that there are only problems which science solves and puzzles which philosophy clears up. Foster insists that in addition to problems and puzzles there are also mysteries and that in addition to science and philosophy which deal with problems and puzzles there is also theology which has to do with mystery. The mystery of God and his holiness and all those things that are by grace and not by nature fall outside the scope of science. Contemporary philosophy recognizes this limitation in an obscure way when it insists that religious language has no literal significance. The analytical philosopher who does not recognize mystery will conclude that such language is merely emotive. The Christian will insist that the peculiarity of religious language is related to the mystery with which it deals. –

The first essay in *Metaphysical Beliefs* also deals with the limitations of science. The second and third essays take up the discussion at this point. If the language of religious belief is not literally significant, what kind of significance has it? If it exercizes a function different from the scientific, to what logical category does it belong? In what sense are expressions of religious belief true and how are they validated?

All four of our authors agree that Christian beliefs are expressed primarily in the form of stories and narrations and that they therefore belong to the category of myth and symbol. Alasdair MacIntyre deals with the question of the justification or validation of such beliefs and asserts that they have to be accepted simply on authority: "we do not offer evidence for these statements, we offer authority for them" (p. 201), whether our authority is the Bible or the Church. He makes his own position quite clear when he says that "this is the logical correlative of Barthianism" (p. 202). If this is the case, we can only say so much the worse for Barthianism. For of what use is it to say that the truth of religious beliefs is settled by an appeal to authority if we have left unsettled the problem of their meaning? It is not enough to assign such beliefs to the category of myth and symbol, for the question still remains, what kind of meaning is it that is conveyed through these forms?

This is the question that Ronald Hepburn explores with great perspicuity in the best of the three essays in this volume. Typologists and theologians of many modern schools share the view that Biblical religion is set forth in developing patterns of recurring images in a manner analogous to the poem, the drama and the novel. It is frequently stated that traditional theology mistakenly modelled itself on philosophy when it should have proceeded in the fashion of dramatic criticism. Hepburn points out the many difficulties

concealed in this analogy. The poetic structure of myth and symbol can be purely imaginative and need have no factual reference. It may have impressive internal coherence and great powers of reconciliation and integration but this does not mean that it gives us truth in the sense of new knowledge about the world. The analogy between the religious image and the poetic image may be helpful in enabling us to identify the kind of meaning conveyed by the former but it does little to establish its truth.

At this point it might be possible to return to MacIntyre's authoritarian solution. Myths and symbols have to be *referred to something* if they are to be more than imaginative constructions unrelated to the world. It may be that the only way in which such reference can be validated is by an appeal to authority based on irrational faith. Alternatively (and this is what Hepburn seems to be suggesting), the theology of myth and symbol may find that it is forced to incorporate much of the more traditional approach including the appeal to historical facts and the much discredited cosmological, teleological and other arguments of rational apologetics. In any case, we cannot leave the symbols floating free; "the symbolic vessel requires a non-symbolic anchor" (p. 162).

These two volumes have the great virtue of facing squarely the problems raised for theology by contemporary analytical philosophy. None of the authors would claim that the problems are here solved. But the agenda has been drawn up and the meeting is under way.

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The Renewal of the Church. By W. A. Visser 't Hooft. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1956. Pp. 128. $2.50.

For a subject of such range and depth this somewhat slim volume of one hundred and twenty-seven pages would seem to be merely an introduction. Dr. Visser't Hooft, however, has concentrated with unusual success his treatment of his theme within this limited compass, and the volume gains rather than suffers by its very brevity.

In the Introduction the reader is reminded that the main discussion has to do with "the nature of the renewal" which is being sought in the area of ecumenical conversations at this stage in the history of the Church. What is even more important, the author makes it unmistakably clear that he is discussing "the renewal of the Church in its historical existence, as the *ecclesia peccatorum.*"

He begins with an examination of the Old Covenant and establishes the fact that the people of God enjoyed a constant renewal of life under this Covenant. In many ways, this was the most significant feature of the history of the people of God, and it is their critical awareness and appraisal of this which gives to the historiography of the Hebrews its unique value and relevance for our present discussion.

This theme is carefully examined in the light of the Old Testament evidence and Dr. Visser't Hooft comes to the firm conclusion that "the whole story of Israel can be described as the dramatic dialogue between the Maker of the Covenant and the breakers of the Covenant." It is not, however, the story of a "vicious circle," beginning with disobedience, and proceeding through judgment to renewal and on to disobedience again. It tells of God's promise that a totally new situation will be created, a promise which was fulfilled in Christ.

There is, of course, the extremely difficult problem in the New Testament, namely, that of deciding whether or not the promise has been completely and finally fulfilled. The author affirms that the evidence points clearly to "the newness which has already come," while it testifies to the fact that "there is the newness which is yet to come." In other words, Christians are faced with the paradox of the "already" and the "not yet."

This whole interpretation is presented under ten headings, and the contrast between the Old and the New Covenant is emphasized. Not only so but, also, the warnings addressed to the people of the Old Covenant must be solemnly heeded. This lies behind and gives particular meaning to the "judgment which begins at the house of God," and, because of the unique relationship between the people of God and God Himself, the whole Church is called to repentance and renewal of life.

In chapters three and four of this volume, the tension between the old and the new in the life of the early Church and the renewal of the Church in history are both examined and interpreted, and the conclusion is reached that in this whole matter of renewal "the Church is its own worst enemy."

The author considers further the conceptions of renewal which prevail within various church traditions and at certain periods in the history of the Church, and discusses each in turn. It is clear that for him renewal is essentially the work of God. The conditions for such renewal include a recognition of the centrality of the Bible and of the Biblical message, the need for repentance, the attempt to re-edify the Church, the recreation of "true fellowship," and the rediscovery of the apostolic character of the Church. Nevertheless, even when these conditions have been established the actual work of renewal is "the work of God."

In the closing chapters Dr. Visser't Hooft discusses the place of the Church in the old world and the renewal of the Church in relation to unity. In many ways these are the most significant chapters in the book and they represent the plea which is the burden of the whole volume.

Dr. Visser't Hooft is contending against Protestant and Roman Catholic advocates that the renewal of the Church is essential to her continuance and testimony and that this task is undertaken by God, the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he urges that "unity and renewal belong together," and it is on this issue that both Protestants and Roman Catholics will part company with him.

However, if they do so, they must both produce far more effective evidence than they have hitherto, both from theology and from history, to establish the identification between their own historical expression of the Church and the ecclesia of God on the one hand, and, on the other, to vindicate doctrinally that theirs is the true Church.

It is not necessary to agree with many of the subsidiary emphases of Dr. Visser't Hooft, for example, his tendency to equate the Bible with the Word of God, as though there were no distinction between the *graphe* and the *logos*, in order to appreciate his important contribution to ecumenical conversations regarding the nature of the Church.

For the basic issue for the whole contemporary Christian enterprise throughout the world is the nature of the Church. It is the tendency to sidestep this issue which makes so much of mass evangelism, missionary effort, church extension and even Christian education in our day, so irrelevant to the need of our age. No effective "word of the Lord" is being spoken, because the Body through which the word is articulated is in schism, and a divided Church has nothing of importance to say to a divided world. Hence the need to examine the renewal of the Church.

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A Study of History. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. Abridgment of Vols. VII–X by D. C. SOMERVELL. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 414. $5.50.

Now that Arnold Toynbee has brought his gargantuan *Study of History* to a close it is gratifying to find in its conclusion the author's answer to our first question, How did this book come to be written? In his explanation he reveals himself as very much a man of this generation. Desperately disturbed by the unhappy turn of events in the twentieth century, so unforeseen by the liberal, progressive, optimistic Victorian age, he set out to discover, if he could, what had happened to upset the Victorian applecart. In thinking about this problem he became aware, thanks to his Classical or Hellenic education, that similar conditions had prevailed in the past. In particular, he saw a deeper meaning in Thucydides' *History*, and realized "that a book written in another world more than 2300 years ago might be a depository of experiences which, in the reader's world, were only just beginning to overtake the reader's own generation." There could be a sense in which the years 1914 A.D. and 431 B.C. were "philosophically contemporaneous." From a comparative study of Western and Hellenic societies he was led on to a search for "as many specimens as he could find of the species of Society of which the Hellenic and the Western were merely two representatives." When he found that most "civilizations" were already dead he was led to investigate the reasons for the "breakdowns and disintegrations" of civiliza-

tions, and then of their "geneses and growths." In all this he had always before him the question, What is going to be the fate of our own Western civilization? But above everything else he found his "vocation" as an historian "in a call from God to 'feel after Him and find Him'."

Toynbee, then, has looked at history with the eyes of one who "believed that Religion was the most important thing in life." As such he has taken "a very long view," a view that has encompassed the world and all its civilized past, and which has seen the patterns of history projected through the present into the far rising future. That so vast a task should have taken ten volumes and twenty-five years to complete is not strange; that the author should have followed his appointed quest to its end is a tribute to the enormous diligence, persistence, and encyclopaedic knowledge, as well as to the abiding faith in the significance of the task, of the most provocative historical thinker of the twentieth century.

In assessing the importance of his task Toynbee has taken a stand commonly held by historians throughout the ages, namely, that the understanding of the past is of value primarily as a guide to men's present and future actions. In order to maintain such a stand it is necessary to believe that history is meaningful, that it has continuity, and that the meanings or patterns which continue are in part, at least, ascertainable. This, of course, Toynbee has done; and, out of his study of history, he has emerged with a series of patterns or "laws"—yin and yang, challenge and response, withdrawal and return, rout and rally, and others—which he offers as the inductive discoveries of years of historical research. With these laws in mind he then attempts to evaluate the present and to read the future.

Toynbee has attracted tremendous public attention, especially in North America, probably more in his capacity of prophet than as historical analyst. At the same time as historian he has aroused the suspicions and hostility of most professional historians everywhere. The literature of historical criticism directed against Toynbee is now legion, and growing rapidly. The criticism all concerns another fundamental question, Has he succeeded in his project? Some critics say flatly that Toynbee's is an impossible project, impossible in scope and by its very nature, for, they contend, no over-all historical pattern is in any way ascertainable. Others point to specific fields of history, condemning him for imperfect and incomplete knowledge, and, therefore, for unreliable reasoning and unacceptable conclusions. The bitterest of all the critics are undoubtedly those who dislike his labelling their culture as "fossil," and those who hate his depreciation of modern nationalism and technology, of secular utopias, and who call him blasphemer and traitor to Western traditions. The fierceness of their language reveals their feelings; these are the worshippers of Man, of the Nation, of the State, and their criticism of Toynbee is really of his religion. Had his findings and prophecies fitted more neatly into their dreams their assault upon his methods would, I suspect, have been distinctly softened. Toynbee also invites criticism—which will

unquestionably be strongly forthcoming—from religious sources, since he goes beyond all existing religions in the last analysis, seeing the future in terms of a synthesis of all the "higher religions." This, he hopes, will come about by peaceful acceptance, perhaps during the rule of a universal state, but in the final event it may result from the total collapse of Western civilization which will then have played out the historic role of all civilizations, that of giving birth at its death to a new higher religion, to Toynbee the true sign of progress in this world of ours.

However unpalatable Toynbee's ideas may be to various kinds of readers it can scarcely be doubted that he has stirred up more thinking about the meaning of history than any other historian of this age. This is one measure, and a very real one, of his success.

With the appearance of D. C. Somervell's second volume all of Toynbee's great work has now been abridged into two volumes of moderate size. The abridgement is an able accomplishment and is accepted by Toynbee himself, who co-operated with Mr. Somervell, as "first-rate" and "a boon" "in a busy age like this." That it may lead readers on to the great work itself is the hope of the author, and of this reviewer, but if that is not possible then there is no question but that one of the most stimulating intellectual creations of our day may be surely approached in the Somervell abridgement.

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Book Notes

The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. Edited by F. L. Cross. London, Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xix, 1492. $14.00.

Almost two decades of exacting editorial labour together with the co-operation of almost a hundred scholars have finally produced this one-volume dictionary of the Christian Church. The articles (about 6,000 of them) are mainly brief and historical in character. Unusual but most helpful is the inclusion of brief but pertinent bibliographies at the end of each article.

On the whole the Biblical and the theological articles, admittedly not numerous, are too brief to be of much service, whereas the historical ones are excellently done. The volume fills a great need and will undoubtedly become an indispensable work especially to the non-specialist who wants to know who St. Simeon Stylites was, what IHS means, about the history of Lent, etc., but has no easy access to a large library.

The Quest and Character of a United Church. By Winfred E. Garrison. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. Pp. 238. $3.50.

Readers will all know Prof. Garrison through his long association with the *Christian Century* as its literary editor. As might be expected from the writer of *A Protestant Manifesto* this book is a plea for ecumenicity. Those who are devoted to the ideal of an amorphous ecumenical body in which almost complete diversity of creed, sacrament, liturgy and structure is to be permitted along with membership and clergy interchangeable among all denominations will find in Prof. Garrison their spokesman.

American Judaism. By Nathan Glazer. Chicago: University Press (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press), 1957. Pp. ix, 176. $3.50.

This book is another volume in the *Chicago History of American Civilization*, a series under the editorship of the Chicago historian, D. J. Boorstin. Mr. Glazer writes from within Judaism and has certainly succeeded in effectively telling the story of three hundred years of Jewry in the United States. Canadian readers, however, will once again wonder whether one can now also speak of *Canadian* Judaism. The delimitation of American History by American historians to events and forces within U.S. borders as though a northern neighbour's history either did not take place or was irrelevant is not convincing. Nonetheless Mr. Glazer has written an informative and interesting book which numerous readers will want to see.

The Mormons. By Thomas F. O'Dea. Chicago: University Press (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1957. Pp. xii, 289. $5.00.

Prof. O'Dea of Fordham University has given an up-to-date sociological analysis of the rise and rapid development of the Church of the Latter Day

Saints in this book. Though not himself a Mormon he has lived among them as a trained observer, and combines quite successfully a certain objectivity with a sympathetic understanding. Anyone interested in this remarkable sect will profit by the reading of this book. The work is particularly valuable in its treatment of the social institutions and forces which make the Mormons a "peculiar people."

Early Bible Illustrations: A Short Study Based on Some Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Century Printed Texts. By JAMES STRACHAN. Cambridge: University Press (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada), 1957. Pp. viii, 170. $3.75.

ONE SUSPECTS that few Canadian students of religious art have concerned themselves at all with the early history of Biblical illustrations. Mr. Strachan is a retired Inspector of Schools who was casually asked to explain the meaning of the woodcuts in an edition of the Great Bible of Henry VIII belonging to the Friends' House Library in London. His search for an answer led him on a fascinating search through old editions in England and the Continent. This book is the result of his enthusiasm. It also contains 126 reproductions of old woodcuts to illustrate Mr. Strachan's reconstructions.

J.W.W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Inclusion of title in this list neither ensures nor precludes subsequent review in this journal)

ABBA, R. *Principles of Christian Worship: with special Reference to the Free Churches.* London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 196. $2.25.

ALLSHORN: *The Notebooks of Florence Allshorn.* Selected and arranged by a member of St. Julian's Community. London: SCM Press (Toronto: Ryerson), 1957. Pp. 128. $1.75.

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BEASLEY-MURRAY, G. R. *A Commentary on Mark Thirteen.* London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. (Toronto: Macmillan Co.), 1957. Pp. v, 124. $3.50.

BOWMAN, J. W., and TAPP, R. W. *The Gospel from the Mount: A New Translation and Interpretation of Matthew, Chapters 5 to 7.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957. Pp. 189. $3.75.

BURGHARDT, W. J. *The Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria* (*The Catholic Univ. of America Studies in Christian Antiquity*, edited by J. Quasten, no. 14). Washington: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1957. Pp. xvi, 194. $3.00.

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GARRISON, W. E. *The Quest and Character of a United Church*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1957. Pp. 238. $3.50.

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WRIGHT, G. E. *Biblical Archaeology.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press (Toronto: Ryerson), 1957. Pp. 288; Illustr. 220; Maps 8. $15.00.

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